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Justice Holmes's Bad Man and the Depleted
Purposes of Punitive Damages
Jill Wieber Lens'
ustice Holmes introduced his bad man as a tool to
separate law and morality. The bad man is not affected
by morality and sees a tort duty only as an obligation
to pay damages. The bad man does not consider any
chance of escaping liability, so he sees that obligation as
mandatory. Applied hypothetically to punitive damages,
the bad man would not appreciate the morality basis for
imposing punitive damages or the moral condemnation
and stigma that traditionally results from that imposition.
Instead, he sees punitive damages as just another check
that he will be required to write.
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Supreme Court
made this hypothetical application a reality. Acting
within its common law authority, the Court explained
its ideal system for imposing punitive damages, citing
Justice Holmes's bad man, and necessarily depleting
the traditional common law punishment and deterrence
purposes of punitive damages. No longer is that
punishment purpose based in morality, and the deterrence
purpose lacks any specific deterrence goal. The Court's
depletion of these common law purposes weakens the
policy behind punitive damages. But more importantly,
the depletion undermines the damages' constitutionality,
which depends on the damages' traditional common law
purposes.
i Associate Professor of Law, Baylor University School of Law. J.D., University of Iowa
College of Law; B.A., University of Wisconsin. The author thanks Todd Pettys and Luke
Meier for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. The author also thanks Heidi Rasmussen,
Baylor J.D. 2014, and Taylor Kilway, Baylor J.D. 2014, for their valuable research assistance.
The author also thanks her then newborn daughter, Hannah Madison, who was sleeping on
the author when she made her final edits and submitted this piece. Any mistakes are, of
course, the author's.
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INTRODUCTION
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,' the Supreme Court concluded that
maritime law limited the punitive damage award imposed in the case to
the amount of the compensatory damage award. Compared to the Court's
various constitutional limitations on punitive damages, Exxon Shipping Co.
seems harmless mostly because it was based on maritime law, which is
federal common law. Just a few years before, the Court held that a punitive
damage award could punish the defendant only for what he did to the
plaintiff.3 Exxon Shipping Co., by comparison, was just a little boat case.
Do not be fooled, however, as Exxon Shipping Co. has far-reaching
effects on the constitutionality of punitive damages. The basis of Exxon
Shipping Co. is maritime law, which is federal common law that integrates
tort common law on punitive damages. Thus, this case afforded the Court
its first opportunity to address punitive damages from a tort law perspective
and explain their punishment and deterrence purposes. These same
common law purposes are what justify, constitutionally, the imposition of
punitive damages. Change the purposes, change the constitutionality.
And the Court did indeed change the purposes; it depleted both the
punishment and deterrence rationales. In describing the ideal system for
imposing punitive damages, the Court cited Justice Holmes's famous bad
man-explaining that "even Justice Holmes's 'bad man' must be able
to look ahead and know the amount of punitive damages he will face.4
To fit this system and be consistent with Justice Holmes's bad man, the
Court necessarily altered punitive damages' traditional punishment and
deterrence purposes.
The Court's conception of punishment is detached from its traditional
morality roots. Justice Holmes introduced his bad man in a theory aimed
at separating law and morality. Applied to punitive damages, the effects are
dramatic. Morality controls what conduct is punishable, and the award of
these damages expresses the jury's moral condemnation, which stigmatizes
the defendant. Without morality, all of these aspects of punitive damages
are lost. The Court also divorces punitive damages from morality within
its own definition of the damages and its choice of the 1:1 ratio in the case.
More important than the loss of morality, however, is that the Court did
not replace the substance of the punishment purpose. The Court describes
punitive damages that may "punish," but we're not sure why or how.
With respect to the deterrence purpose, long before Exxon Shipping
Co., the Court made clear that the damages' deterrence purpose was less
constitutionally powerful than the punishment purpose.5 When given the
2 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008).
3 See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 349 (2007).
4 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 473.
5 See infra Part I.C.i.
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chance in Exxon Shipping Co. to more clearly define that purpose, the Court
declined and left the purpose lacking. The citation to Justice Holmes's
bad man, who assumes he will pay compensatory damages, rejects the
inclusion of either optimal or complete deterrence within the damages'
common law purpose. The Court also affirmed the imposition of punitive
damages despite guaranteed liability, which is inconsistent with optimal
deterrence. Ultimately, in Exxon Shipping Co., the Court describes the
damages' deterrence purpose generically without any specific aim.
The Court has imposed numerous constitutional limitations on punitive
damages. 6 Ultimately though, punitive damages' common law punishment
and deterrence purposes justify their constitutionality. In Exxon Shipping
Co., a common law case, the Court undercuts that constitutionality by
depleting the damages' common law purposes. Regarding punishment,
damages divorced from morality cannot further state interests in punishing
immoral actors, and imposing "punishment" without a basis for the
imposition is not legitimate. As for deterrence, the Court identifies only a
vague idea of deterrence, creating legitimacy problems, and continues to
ignore the relevance of a defendant's chances of escaping liability, which
affects the damages' ability to achieve any type of deterrence. Regardless
of their constitutionality, if punitive damages seek to further punishment
and deterrence based only upon arbitrary and unsubstantiated standards,
there is no meaningful policy reason for their existence.
Part I of this article describes the origin of punitive damages and
their constitutional relevance. Part II explores the appearance of Justice
Holmes's bad man in the Exxon Shipping Co. decision and briefly describes
the bad man theory. Part III argues that the Court's analysis in Exxon
Shipping Co., including its citation of the bad man, leaves the punishment
purpose of punitive damages with little substance and similarly hollows
the deterrence purpose. Part IV explores the implications of the Court's
described depleted common law purposes of punitive damages-namely,
the likely unconstitutionality of punitive damages.
I. THE PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE PURPOSES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages are civil damages exceeding the amount necessary
to compensate a plaintiff.7 Tort law awards punitive damages to fulfill its
interests in "punish[ing] wrongdoers and deter[ring] wrongful conduct[.]"
8
6 See infra discussion Part I.C.
7 See Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 491 (explaining that punitive damages are damages
"beyond the compensatory").
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 90 i(c) (1979); see also Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S.
at 491 (explaining that the historical purposes of punitive damages were to "punish[] ...
extraordinary wrongdoing" and to deter by setting an example); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,416 (2003) ("[Plunitive damages serve a broader function; they
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Courts created punitive damages to fulfill the distinct purposes of
punishment and deterrence.
These same purposes are relevant to a constitutional challenge to a
punitive damage award. The imposition of damages fulfills these traditional
purposes and furthers state interests in punishing and deterring tortfeasors.
A. Courts' Creation of Damages to Punish and Deter
The idea of imposing damages to punish has ancient roots in Babylonian
and Roman law and is also found in the Bible.9 As an example, Roman law
included a concept of multiple damages, which blended punishment with
compensation and was used to constrain wealthy elites. Without multiple
damages, a wealthy man could "'amuse himself by striking those whom he
met in the streets in the face, and then tendering them the legal amends,
from a wallet which a slave carried after him for the purpose."' ' 10
The specific doctrine of punitive damages originated in English
common law. In a pair of 1763 cases, Wilkes v. Wood"I and Huckle v. Money,'
2
English courts awarded formal "exemplary" damages to "punish and deter
the misuse of wealth and power...." 3 Generally, exemplary damages were
available in cases involving intentional aggravated conduct. 4 Scholars
disagree about the precise purpose for the imposition of punitive damages
in England, whether it was to compensate the plaintiff or purely to punish
and deter the defendant.is Whatever the original purpose, the law did
" evolve to the point at which it was clear that the object of punitive or
exemplary damages was to punish and deter."'6
Soon after their birth in England, punitive damages were awarded in
America. 7 Like in England, punitive damages were imposed only in cases
are aimed at deterrence and retribution."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568
(1996) ("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests
in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").
9 Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuiy of Punitive Damages Awards:
Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1285-86 (1993).
i o Id. at 1286 (quoting Vindictive Damages, 4 AM. L.J. 6I, 75 (1852)).
I i Wilkes v. Wood, (I763) 95 Eng. Rep. 766; 2 Wils. K.B. 203.
12 Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768; 2 Wils. K.B. 205.
13 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 9, at 1289.
14 Id. at 1287.
15 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE
4-6 (2d ed. 20 12).
16 Id. at 7.
17 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 9, at 129o (noting that punitive damages first appeared
in a reported case in 1784); see also Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (185 1) ("It is a well-
established principle of the common law, that in ... actions on the case for torts, a jury may
inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in
view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.").
[Vol. IOI
JUSTICE HOLMES'S BAD MAN
involving willful and wanton indignities.18 And, like in England, the law
has evolved to the point that the clear purposes of the damages-i.e., the
very reasons that the damages exist-are punishment and deterrence.19
B. The Distinct Punishment and Deterrence Purposes
The punishment and deterrence purposes of punitive damages are "not
always in harmony with each other.""0 As each theory requires different
measures and can lead to different damage awards, the total amount of
punitive damages may vary according to whether the approach is based on
punishment or deterrence."1
1. Punishment Briefly Explained.-Although courts have always made
clear that punishment, or retribution, is a purpose of imposing
punitive damages,"2 they "do not usually explain what they mean by
punishment.... ,"3 What they appear to have in mind, however, is that a
punitive damage award is the defendant's "just deserts" for his immoral
conduct.2 4 The moral culpability of the defendant and his conduct justifies
18 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 9, at 1291.
19 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,492 (zoo8); see also id. at 491-92 (explaining
that even if punitive damages once served as compensation for intangible injuries, those
injuries are now covered by compensatory damages).
2o DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQuITY-RESTITUTION § 3.11(04), at 354
(2d ed. 1993).
zl See id. § 3.11(15), at 355; see also id. § 3.11(3), at 324 ("[Punitive awards based on
deterrence] may be measured quite differently from awards that seek to administer punitive
just deserts .... ").
22 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
23 DoBBs,supra note 20, § 3.I1(2),at3I9n.2.
24 Id.; see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 59 1,
6oI-O2 (1996) ("'A retributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves
it."' (quoting Michael S. Moore, TheMoral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER,
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman
ed., 1987))). The punishment purpose of punitive damages can become more complicated
depending on whether it is limited to a private law function or can serve a public law function.
If limited to a private law function, the punishment is limited to vindicating "the dignity of
an individual victim by allowing her to punish the defendant for committing a humiliating or
insulting tort upon her." Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams:
The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 434 (2008). If able to serve
a public law function, the punishment could vindicate society's interest in punishing the
defendant for his wrongful conduct. See Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive
Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 246 (2009) (introducing a punitive
damage measurement that would achieve the public's interest in retributivist justice, which is
one measurement within the pluralistic approach Markel advocates).
2012-20131
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the punishment. 25 It similarly controls whether to inflict punishment. 6 If
morally culpable, the defendant should be "made to suffer in a way that
appropriately corresponds to his wrong." 7
2. Deterrence Briefly Explained.-Courts have also always made clear that
deterrence is a valid reason for imposing punitive damages.2 8 Like with
punishment, courts do not explain what they have in mind when they
mention the "deterrence" purpose. Generally, deterrence is focused
on discouraging future tortious behavior, an idea independent of "just
deserts. '2 9 But multiple concepts exist within "deterrence," and these
multiple concepts can call for different measurements of damages.
The first distinction to draw is between specific and general deterrence.
"In simplest terms, 'specific deterrence' seeks to deter the defendant ...
from repeating a wrongful act."' 30 Specific deterrence is thus focused on
deterring a specific defendant from committing the same conduct again.
General deterrence, on the other hand, seeks to "deter others who might
otherwise engage in the same type of conduct at issue in the lawsuit."
'31
25 See DOBBs, supra note 20, § 3.11(2), at 318 ("The punishment rationale holds that it is
just to impose suffering upon a defendant who has engaged in extreme wrongdoing."); Kahan,
supra note 24, at 6o1-o2.
26 Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment,
andthe Politics ofJury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 173 (1991) ("Whether to inflict punishment
is a purely moral judgment").
27 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 3.11(2), at 318; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 426 (2003) (describing a "major role" of punitive damages as
condemning immoral conduct).
28 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court has referred to
the purposes of punitive damages separately, deterrence is sometimes thought of as a "purpose
of punishment, rather than ... a parallel purpose, along with punishment itselfl.]" Kemezy
v. Peters, 79 F3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a), at 24-25 (2d ed. 1986) (listing deterrence and retribution as separate
theories of punishment). Regardless of word choice, the Court recognizes a distinction
between punishment and deterrence, which is further demonstrated by the Court's use of the
words punishment and retribution interchangeably. In the article, the author will refer to the
two purposes as "punishment" and "deterrence" and assume the same distinction that the
Court gives the two purposes.
29 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 3.11(2), at 318.
30 Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court's Recent Punitive
Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 88o, 887 (2OO8); see also A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, III HAv. L. REv. 869,877
n. 13 (1998) ("[Slpecific deterrence.., is the effect that the imposition of a sanction on a party
will have on that party's future behavior.").
31 Scheuerman, supra note 3o, at 887; see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3o , at 877
("[G]eneral deterrence [is] the effect that the prospect of having to pay damages will have on the
behavior of similarly situated parties in the future (not just on the behavior of the defendant
at hand).").
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One problem that general deterrence theories focus on is the possibility
that a potential defendant will escape liability for her torts.3' This will
happen if the injured plaintiff does not realize his injury, or even if he
does, he is unable to realize who caused his injury.33 Or, even if the injury
is detected, the tort claim/remedy may go unenforced. For example, the
plaintiff may choose not to bring a lawsuit if his damages are minimal or
if he has a distaste for the legal system.34 Whether the chance of escaping
liability is based on under-detection or under-enforcement, as long as the
chance exists, defendants may be undeterred.
To remedy these chances of under-detection and/or under-
enforcement, one theory of general deterrence-the optimal deterrence
theory-includes a cost-internalization calculation of punitive damages.
The calculation is:
[Plunitive damages should be set at a level such that the
expected damages of defendants equal the harm they have
caused, for then their damage payments will, in an average sense,
equal the harm. This implies a simple formula for calculating
punitive damages, according to which harm is multiplied by a
factor reflecting the likelihood of escaping liability.3
As an example, suppose the defendant misrepresented its car to be
"new," even though the car was actually worth $4000 less than a new car.36
Suppose further that the probability of being held liable was only two in
fourteen, so 1/7. 3 7 The cost-internalization calculation dictates that the
amount of harm, $4000, is multiplied by the chance escaping liability, 7,
totaling $28,000.38 This total $28,000 award would be based on $4000 in
32 F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages Awards: "Morals
Without Technique"?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 381 (2OO8) ("Detection of wrongdoing is of limited
deterrent value if that wrongdoing is not sanctioned. Therefore, plaintiffs must bring suit if
punitive damages are to provide the deterrent sanction."). This same issue can occur within
specific deterrence also--even if a defendant has already paid punitive damages once, he
still may choose to risk the conduct again based on the chances of under-detection and
under-enforcement. Specific methods to fix the problems of under-detection and under-
enforcement, however, are usually more associated with general deterrence ideas.
33 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3o , at 888.
34 Id. Polinsky and Shavell also point to the possibility that a defendant may "escape
liability" because an injured plaintiff may not file suit if "the likelihood of establishing
causation is low." Id. If the plaintiff cannot establish causation, the defendant would not be
liable (and thus no liability for the defendant to "escape"). Seeinfra note 254 and accompanying
text (discussing that "escaping liability" is not a risk when liability is not possible).
35 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3o , at 954.
36 See id. at 9oi (discussing the calculation of damages in BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)).
37 Seeid. at 9o2.
38 See id.
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compensatory damages and $24,000 in punitive damages.3 9 Under this
calculation, defendants will end up paying damages based on the total
amount of harm that they have caused even though not all injured plaintiffs
successfully sue. 40 If liability is guaranteed, no multiplication is necessary
and the defendant should pay only compensatory damages in an amount
"equal to the harm the defendant has caused."
4'
The proponents of optimal deterrence believe that any amount
of damages over the cost-internalization calculation will result in
overdeterrence, causing defendants to undertake excessive precautions.
4
Defendants will then pass on the costs of these precautions to consumers.
43
Or, even worse, defendants will choose to not engage in the activity even
though it is socially desirable.'
The other main theory of general deterrence-complete deterrence-
differs from optimal deterrence in that it uses a gain-elimination
calculation. 41 Instead of taking into account the total harm caused,
the calculation "requires the court to divide the defendant's gain by the
probability of liability.. 6 "[T]he penalty should be at least as large as the
minimum of the illicit gain expected by the offender. '47 To illustrate the
difference between the two calculations: "If the offender gains $100 from
committing an offensive act that imposes a $10 loss on his victim, the cost
39 See id.
40 See id. at 889-90.
41 Id. at 878. One exception exists to the inappropriateness of punitive damages if
liability is guaranteed-if the tortious conduct "produces no social gain, only harm." Id. at
909. The example Polinsky and Shavell give is if the defendant punches the plaintiff with
the intent to cause harm. Id. This type of conduct should be deterred completely, and total
damages in excess of the plaintiff's harm may be necessary to achieve complete deterrence.
Id.
42 Id. at 879.
43 Id. at 882.
44 Id. at 882-83 (pointing to defendants' cessation of vaccine production because of
potential tort liability).
45 Optimal deterrence contemplates that the conduct may continue, but the defendant
must pay for the total harm caused. Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1383, 1391 n.18 (2oo9). The goal of complete deterrence, on the other hand, is
that "zero instances of the particular misconduct would occur." Id. Even the proponent of
the complete deterrence theory, Professor Keith Hylton, advocates the optimal deterrence
cost-internalization calculation if the defendant's conduct is economically desirable. See Keith
N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEo. L.J. 421, 428-30
(1998). Professor Hylton believes, however, that most punitive damages cases involve non-
economically desirable conduct. See id. at 423,439-44.
46 Hylton, supra note 45, at 423.
47 Brief Amicus Curiae of Professors Keith N. Hylton et al. in Support of Respondents
at 19, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (No. 05-1256), 2oo6 WL 2688793.
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internalization approach would require a penalty of $10, while the gain
elimination approach would require a minimum penalty of $100."48
Like cost-internalization, however, the gain-elimination calculation
factors in the probability of escaping liability.49 If the defendant's total
expected gain is $100 and he is likely to escape liability half of the time,
his punitive damage award should total at least the gain doubled.50 This is
the only way to ensure the defendant is stripped of all of his illicit gains.'
Unlike optimal deterrence, there is no problem if damages exceed the
gain doubled; the point is to completely deter, so overdeterrence is not
problematic.5" Also unlike optimal deterrence, the complete deterrence
theory leaves open the possibility for a punitive award even when liability
is certain.53
C. The Constitutional Justification of Punitive Damages
The same purposes that justified the creation of punitive damages also
justify them constitutionally. The question of the constitutionality of a
punitive damage award "begins with an identification of the state interests
that a punitive award is designed to serve."5 4 Those state interests mirror
the purposes that justify punitive damages' existence-punishment and
deterrence. 5
An award becomes unconstitutional if it is "'grossly excessive' in relation
to" the state's punishment and deterrence interests. 56 Because the state
interests mirror the damages' common law purposes, the "grossly excessive"
48 Id. at 12. Professor Hylton refers to the $10O as a minimum penalty and acknowledges
that a greater penalty would also be acceptable; he is not worried about overdeterrence if the
conduct is socially undesirable. See Hylton, supra note 45, at 43 1.
49 See BriefAmicus Curiae of Professors Keith N. Hylton et al. in Support of Respondents,
supra note 47, at 16 ("Increasing the penalty to ensure that the infrequently-caught offender
is stripped of illicit gains .. .is equivalent (in economic deterrence terms) to taking into
account the harms done to others by an offender when punishing that offender.").
50 Id.
51 See Hylton, supra note 45, at 460.
52 Id. at 431 (explaining that overdeterrence is not a concern because "society has no
interest in permitting the offensive activity to occur, at any level.").
53 See id. at 453-54 (evaluating the facts of Exxon Shipping Co. and concluding that a
punitive damage award is appropriate if the activity is characterized as "incompetently"
"piloting supertankers," even though liability is certain).
54 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
55 Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1113 (2005)
(explaining that the legitimate State interests that justify the imposition of punitive damages
are "the substantive objectives or purposes to be served by tort liability"); see also BMW,
517 U.S. at 568 ("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate
interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").
56 BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
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standard is the same as asking whether the award "unreasonably exceed[s]
the amount required for purposes of punishment and deterrence."57
To help resolve this constitutional inquiry, the Court created three
guideposts," which supposedly "adopt the common-law objectives of
punishment and deterrence."59 A closer evaluation of the guideposts,
however, shows that they rely more heavily on the damages' punishment
purpose than the deterrence purpose, meaning that the punishment
purpose is more powerful constitutionally.6" This idea is further supported
by the Court's later holdings, which appear to conclude that damage
measurements based on deterrence are unconstitutional.
1. The Punishment Purpose's Constitutional Power.-In BMWv. Gore, the Court
announced three guideposts to evaluate the constitutionality of a punitive
damage award.61 Briefly, they are: 1) the level of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, 2) the ratio of the punitive to compensatory damages,
and 3) the criminal or civil sanctions for comparable conduct.62 In reality,
courts use only the first two guideposts,6 3 both of which reflect the damages'
punishment purpose, rather than deterrence purpose.
57 Geistfeld, supra note 55 at 1 113.
58 BMW, 517 U.S. at 574-75.
59 Geistfeld, supra note 55 at I 113.
6o See Catherine M. Sharkey, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages: Theory, Empirics,
and Doctrine, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer H. Arlen ed.)
(forthcoming Nov. 2013) [hereinafter Sharkey, Economic Analysis] (manuscript at 16), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=199o336 ("[T]he Court ... has intimated that punishment is the
predominant purpose [of punitive damages], with deterrence perhaps an incidental effect.").
61 BMW, 51 7 U.S. at 574.
62 Id. at 574-75.
63 See Andrew C.W. Lund, The Road from Nowhere? Punitive Damage Ratios After BMW v.
Gore and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 2o TouRo L. REV. 943,
954 (2005) ("[C]ourts rarely apply the third guidepost.... [T]he Court itself has expressed
concern over the propriety of applying the third guidepost."). The Court has not explained
this guidepost or addressed its numerous problems. Unaddressed issues facing courts include
identifying comparable conduct (and consequently which sanction to examine) and the
impossibility of comparing criminal or regulatory sanctions with punitive damage awards.
Hubbard, supra note 32, at 372-73.
It is difficult to analyze the third guidepost in punishment or deterrence terms because of
the Court's cursory application of it. In BMW, the Court pointed out that the maximum civil
penalty for comparable conduct in any state was $1o,ooo, an amount dwarfed by the imposed
$2 million punitive award. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583-84. In State Farm, the Court chose not to
"dwell long" on the guidepost because, again, a state civil sanction of $Io,ooo was "dwarfed
by the $145 million punitive damages award." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408,428 (2003). The analysis, however, likely depends on legislative intent. See Harmelin
v. Michigan, 5oi U.S. 957, 989 (199i) (explaining that the weight of punishment, deterrence,
or even rehabilitation in determining a criminal punishment is an "eminently legislative
judgment"). If the legislature set the amount of a statutory sanction with a punishment
purpose in mind, then comparable punitive damage awards fulfill the punishment purpose.
If the legislature set the sanction higher to account for the risk of under-detection or under-
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a. Reprehensibility: The More Immoral the Conduct,
the Greater the Punishment
The thought behind the level of reprehensibility guidepost is that
the amount of punitive damages should vary according to the defendant's
culpability. A defendant who acts maliciously deserves to pay a greater
punitive award than a defendant who acts recklessly.64 In constitutional
terms, the state's interest is greater when the defendant acts maliciously,
thus allowing a higher punitive damage award.
The level of reprehensibility guidepost focuses almost exclusively
on the state's interest in punishment. Malicious conduct is more morally
culpable than reckless conduct, thus a defendant who commits malicious
conduct deserves greater punishment than a defendant who commits
reckless conduct.
Given its focus on the punishment purpose, it is not surprising that this
guidepost does not implicate the deterrence purpose of punitive damages.
"That a defendant's conduct can be described as reprehensible is in itself
irrelevant. ' 65 Deterrence concerns are implicated when there is a chance of
under-detection or under-enforcement. Reprehensibility does not control
these chances. And focusing on reprehensibility can distort the deterrence
purposes of punitive damages by imposing punitive damages even though
liability is certain 66 or not imposing punitive damages when conduct is
socially undesirable but not reprehensible.
67
enforcement, then comparable punitive damages would also fulfill the deterrence purpose. See
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3o, at 927-28.
64 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-76 (explaining that some forms of tortious conduct are more
blameworthy than others). The Court further explained the factors to be considered regarding
reprehensibility of conduct in State Farm:
We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by
considering whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the
tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or
safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct
involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result
of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
538 U.S. at 419. Additionally, the Court has explained that a profit motivation makes conduct
more reprehensible. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494 (2008). These factors can
sometimes conflict; a profit motive makes conduct more reprehensible, but causing economic
harm is less reprehensible than causing physical harm.
65 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 30, at 906; see also Gary T Schwartz, Deterrence and
Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 141
(1982) ("The common law's criteria governing eligibility for punitive damages-'malice,'
'recklessness,' and 'conscious disregard' for victim's rights-likewise seem out of line with
the standards one would expect from a deterrence oriented system."). But see Hylton, supra
note 45, at 455-56 (arguing that reprehensibility can be relevant in determining whether the
defendant undertook the conduct to pursue a gain at the victim's expense).
66 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3o, at 905-06.
67 Id. at 907-08.
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Some think this guidepost does reflect the deterrence purpose because
the Court mentioned in BMW v. Gore that repeated conduct is more
reprehensible.68 Under-detection and under-enforcement, however, are
usually not problems associated with a recidivist defendant who has been
detected and already sued in tort. Plus, the Court expressed that repeated
conduct should be punished more harshly because it is more immoral, not
because of the need for deterrence.6 9
This guidepost also potentially reflects the deterrence purpose since
the Court mentioned that attempts to conceal an injury increase the level
of reprehensibility. Attempts to conceal could lead to under-detection."
But the level of reprehensibility does not control the chances of under-
detection, which can be high even without attempts to conceal. 7 And again,
the Court seems to believe that attempts to conceal should be punished
more harshly because they make the conduct more immoral, not because
of the need for deterrence."
b. Ratio: The More Harm Caused, the Greater the Punishment
This guidepost dictates that "[d]efendants who do more harm should
generally be punished more, and compensatory awards are the best
available measure of harm caused."73 In constitutional terms, the state's
interest is greater when the defendant causes a greater amount of harm,
thus allowing a higher punitive damage award.
7 4
68 BMW, 517 U.S. at 577.
69 Id. ("Our holdings that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a first offender
recognize that repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an individual instance of
malfeasance.").
70 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3o, at 908.
71 Id. Defendant's attempts to conceal the plaintiff's injury may be relevant to show the
plaintiff's failure to detect the injury, but not controlling. See id.
72 See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. i, 51 (199) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("[T]he defendant's awareness of any hazard which his conduct has caused or is likely to cause,
and any concealment or 'cover-up' of that hazard ... should all be relevant in determining
this degree of reprehensibility." (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d zI8, 223 (Ala.
1989))).
73 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World
Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239, 1264 (2002). But see Jill Wieber Lens,
Procedural Due Process and Predictable Punitive Damage Awards, 2012 BYU L. REv. 1, 45-46
(2012) (arguing the ratio guidepost is logically flawed because compensatory damages do not
provide an objective judgment of the extent of harm); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages:
From Myth to Theory, 92 IowA L. REV. 957, 988 (2007) ("[]uries do not treat a dollar's worth
of harm the same regardless of the character of the wrong.... [Pleople believe that a dollar's
worth of injury warrants different degrees of punishment based on the nature of the injury-
producing conduct.").
74 The Court has refused to define any set acceptable ratios, but it has mentioned that
single-digit ratios are most likely to be constitutional. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,410 (2003).
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Like the level of reprehensibility guidepost, this guidepost involves the
state's interest in punishment. It focuses on proportionality: the amount
of punitive damages must be proportional to the harm that the defendant
caused to the plaintiff. The more harm caused, the more immoral
the conduct. As the Supreme Court has explained in the criminal law
context, "[piroportionality is inherently a retributive concept, and perfect
proportionality is the talionic law,"75 which means that the punishment
should match the crime.
Given proportionality's relevance to retribution, its irrelevance
to deterrence should not be surprising. In the Court's own words, "it
becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of 'proportionality,' once
deterrence . . . [is] given significant weight."76 Again, deterrence's main
focus is on under-detection or under-enforcement." Proportionality, on
the other hand, focuses on whether the punishment fits the tort, which,
according to this guidepost, is defined by the amount of harm the defendant
caused.
Although proportionality is inherently a retributive concept, the Court's
explanation of this guidepost includes some deterrence-like language. For
example, the Court specifically noted that a greater disparity between the
amount of compensatory and punitive damages may be permissible if the
plaintiff's injury is hard to detect or the plaintiff's compensatory damages
are minimal,78 factors that increase the chances of under-detection and
under-enforcement. This language is consistent with both optimal
deterrence and complete deterrence ideas because it acknowledges that
an award should be higher if the chances of escaping liability are high.79
75 Harmelin v. Michigan, 5o U.S. 957, 989 (1991). But see Catherine M. Sharkey, The
Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 25,
28-29 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, Litigation Marathon] ("The Court has never even tried to
relate the ratio factor to any underlying justification for punitive damages .... With respect to
the punishment goal, the absence of a correlation between the mens rea ... of the wrongdoer
and [the] measure of the actual harm inflicted should surprise no one.").
76 Harmelin, 5o U.S. at 989; see also Hubbard, supra note 32, at 384 ("[Dleterrence
provides a basis for punishments that are... not proportional to wrongdoing.... Consequently,
a jury might impose a punitive damages award that is 'disproportionately' high in terms
of retribution to deter wrongdoing that is hard to detect or committed by a wealthy
defendants."); Hylton, supra note 45, at 454-55 (explaining that the requirement of some
relationship between compensatory and punitive damages makes no sense if gain elimination
is the goal of punitive damages); Sebok, supra note 73, at 988 ( "[A]nchoring punitive damages
on compensatory damages ... does not cohere well within a theory of efficient deterrence.").
77 See Sharkey, Litigation Marathon, supra note 75, at 29 ("[T]he relevant relationship
between punitive and compensatory damages [based upon deterrence purposes] focuses on
the likelihood of detection, not the relative size of the compensatory damages.").
78 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996).
79 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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It is more consistent with optimal deterrence than complete deterrence,
though, as the ratio looks to the harm the defendant caused the plaintiff.8"
Although the Court has noted the possibility of a higher ratio, it has not
explained when it is appropriate.8 Instead, the Court's opinions "appear
to eliminate or minimize this detection concern. '82 State Farm involved
a factual scenario in which the chances of under-detection and under-
enforcement were high because the type of people injured by the conduct
were unlikely to discover their injuries and/or unlikely to file suit.83 Justice
Kennedy, however, labeled the case as "neither close nor difficult." 84
"[H]is opinion appear[ed] to ignore th[e deterrence] concern and to focus
solely on retribution because it simply concluded that 'the argument that
State Farm will be punished in only the rare case ... had little to do with
the actual harm sustained' by the plaintiffs."85 Thus, the Court did not
utilize that higher ratio in State Farm, even though it described the chances
of under-detection and under-enforcement, and the resulting need for
deterrence, as high.
2. The Deterrence Purpose' Lack of Constitutional Power-The minimal
relevance of deterrence to the guideposts automatically limits its power
and relevance in constitutionally justifying the amount of an award. But the
Court has not completely negated that relevance. Years before it created
the guideposts, the Court clarified that deterrence alone could justify-
constitutionally-the imposition of punitive damages.86 Similarly, even in
8o See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Hylton, supra note 45, at 454-55
("In some cases where gain elimination is probably the appropriate goal of punishment, the
search for some reasonable relationship between the compensatory and punitive portions of
the award is likely to lead the court to choose an inappropriately small award-that is, an
award that fails to secure the socially desirable level of deterrence.").
8i See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3o, at 899 ("[Ciourts occasionally refer to
considerations that bear on the probability that a defendant would have escaped liability.
But they rarely explain in a direct and systematic way how this probability should be used to
determine the proper level of damages for deterrence purposes.").
82 Hubbard, supra note 32, at 381.
83 The victims of State Farm's conduct were poor, uneducated about their rights, lacking
an alternative, and thus vulnerable to deceit. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408,433 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 409.
85 Hubbard, supra note 32, at 381 (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427).
86 In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance. Co. v. Haslip, the Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of imposing punitive damages on a defendant liable only because of
respondeat superior. 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991). Respondeat superior holds an employer liable
merely because it employed an employee and that employee committed a tort within the
scope of his employment. See id. at 6. The employer is not at "fault" and the punishment
purpose cannot justify the imposition of punitive damages. But the Court affirmed the
imposition of punitive damages under these circumstances based on deterrence: "Imposing
liability without independent fault deters fraud more than a less stringent rule." Id. at 14.
"Imposing exemplary damages on the corporation when its agent commits intentional fraud
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BMW, the Court implied that deterrence could justify some award, just
not the one at issue in the case. 7 And in his concurrence, Justice Breyer
explained that deterrence "could permit juries to calculate punitive
damages by making a rough estimate of global harm, dividing that estimate
by a similarly rough estimate of the number of successful lawsuits that
would likely be brought."88
However, Justice Breyer's deterrence-based calculation did not live to
see the light of day. The Court first subtly rejected it in State Farm, refusing
to consider the possibility of other successful lawsuits, labeling those
lawsuits as irrelevant to the plaintiffs' harm. 89 This limits the application of
both the cost-internalization and gain-elimination calculations of punitive
damages because both consider the chances of a defendant escaping
liability.90
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the Court made clear that the
potential success of other lawsuits against the defendant for the same
conduct was constitutionally irrelevant.9' In Philip Morris, the punitive
damage award arguably included amounts that punished the defendant
for harming nonparties (other people with potential tort claims against the
defendant).9" The Court specifically held that a punitive damage award
could not constitutionally encompass damages for the defendant's conduct
to nonparties, 93 which would include considerations such as whether the
defendant was likely to escape liability for harm to nonparties.
creates a strong incentive for vigilance .... Id.
The imposition of punitive damages based on pure respondeat superior theory, a theory
that imposes liability despite the lack of fault, was also before the Court in Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker 554 U.S. 471, 484 (2oo8). The Ninth Circuit upheld the imposition of punitive
damages based on this theory, following the rule in the Second Restatement allowing punitive
damages if the employee committing the tort was a manager. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(c) (1977).
The eight Justices who participated in Exxon Shipping Co. split evenly on this issue,
meaning the Ninth Circuit's opinion was affirmed. 554 U.S. at 484. Speculation is that the four
Justices who wanted to reverse, possibly on the basis that punitive liability is inappropriate,
were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. See Doug Rendleman,
Common Law Punitive Damages: Somethi;g for Everyone?, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1, 17 (2009)
("[Tihe smart money speculates that Justice Souter joined the dissenters-Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-in voting for vicarious liability."). Regardless, the Ninth Circuit's
opinion stands because of Justice Alito's recusal. See Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 484 ( "IT]
he disposition ... is not precedential on the derivative liability question.").
87 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,584 (1996) ("[An award] cannot be justified
on the ground that it was necessary to deter future misconduct without considering whether
less drastic remedies could be expected to achieve that goal.").
88 Id. at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89 State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 41, 45-5 1.
91 Philip Morris USA v Williams, 549 U.S. 346,354-55 (2007).
92 Id. at 351.
93 Id. at 349.Technically, the Court's conclusion was based in procedural due process.This
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Concepts of deterrence focusing on under-detection and under-
enforcement of other potential lawsuits, thus, are not powerful enough
to constitutionally justify a punitive damage award. If either optimal
or complete deterrence theories survive Philip Morris, they are more
limited-considering only the likelihood that the defendant would escape
liability for the tortious conduct to that particular plaintiff.94 This limited
interpretation looks more like a specific deterrence theory because of its
focus on the particular plaintiff and defendant.95
Some believe, however, that Philip Morris rejects the deterrence
purpose of punitive damages as a whole. For example, the substantive
portions of the Philip Morris opinion do not include the words "deterrence"
or "deter," but include numerous mentions of "punish" or "punishment."
96
And "if juries are not allowed to consider the impact on non-parties
when fashioning punitive damages awards, the defendants will almost by
definition be under-deterred (because not nearly all of those harmed by
the conduct will bring their own lawsuits)."97 Similarly, if punitive damages
are "limited only to the amount necessary to avenge the moderate harm to
the individual plaintiff, a rational defendant ... might continue to engage
in the wrongdoing. '"98
basis makes little sense, however, given that the defendant received all necessary procedural
protections. Many have concluded that the conclusion is more accurately based in substantive
due process. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Constitution and Fundamental Rights,
18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. Poi'v, at xi, xii (2007); Keith N. Hylton, Due Process and Punitive Damages:
An Economic Approach, 2 CHARLESTON L. REv. 345, 371 (2oo8); Lens, supra note 73, at 23;
Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony J. Franze, Instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: Due Process
Revisited After Philip Morris v. Williams, IO U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 1147, 1150, 1157-59 (zoo8);
Jeremy T. Adler, Comment, Losing the Procedural Battle but Winning the Substantive War: How
Philip Morris v. Williams Reshaped Reprehensibility Analysis in Favor of Mass-Tort Plaintiffs, i1
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 729, 745-46 (2009).
94 Markel, supra note 45, at 1410 (explaining that the cost-internalization calculation
survives Philip Morris if the calculation is limited to "the likelihood that the defendant would
escape having to pay for that harm" to the specific plaintiff). The Court did not discuss Keith
Hylton's gain-elimination theory in Philip Morris even though Professor Hylton presented his
theory in his amicus brief. Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris, 27 REV.
LITIG. 9, 28 (2007) ("[T]he ideal approach to punitive damages ... outlined in my amicus
briefl] apparently had no effect on the Supreme Court's decision .... ").
95 Seesupra text accompanying note 30.
96 Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The
Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 343, 365 (2oo8); Colby,
supra note 24, at 457-58 (explaining that the Court started Philip Morris with the mention of
the two purposes of punitive damages but never mentioned deterrence again).
97 Micah L. Berman, Smoking Out the Impact of Tobacco-Related Decisions on Public Health
Law, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 57 (2009).
98 Colby, supra note 24, at 458; see Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why
the Supreme Court Needs a Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 804-05
(2oO) ("[The Court's decisions] in State Farm and then Philip Morris... will inevitably dilute
the deterrent impact on other similarly situated tortfeasors. Why take socially optimal care if
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Overall, punitive damages' morality-based punishment purpose
is prominent in the Court's constitutional analysis. When it comes to
constitutional justification, punitive damages' deterrence plays second
fiddle.
II. THE COMMON LAW-BASED EXXON SHIPPING Co.
"[T]he Court has tried to avoid taking a position on the appropriate
purpose[s] of punitive damages ...... 99 The Court's avoidance was proper
as its constitutionally-based punitive damages cases were state law tort
claims.1°° In state law tort claims, the Court lacks "the authority.., to alter
the rules of the common law" purposes of punitive damages, 0' or to define
a "standard of excessiveness"' 0 based on those purposes.
Because tort law is state law, the Court should never have the authority
to directly take a position on the appropriate purposes of punitive damages,
at least not in something more than dicta. But the Court had this very
authority in Exxon Shipping Co. because of the common law basis and
the relationship between maritime and tort law. °3 The Court used the
opportunity to explore its ideal system for imposing punitive damages. In
doing so, the Court cited Justice Holmes's bad man, a theory that Justice
Holmes introduced to separate law and morality.
A. The Maritime (Common) Law Basis
Factually, Exxon Shipping Co. was based on the Exxon Valdez oil spill."°
The jury found the defendant, Exxon Shipping Co., to be reckless in
retaining a known relapsed alcoholic to captain a tanker carrying crude oil,
you are only required to pay for a portion of the harm you actually cause?").
99 Geistfeld, supra note 55, at 11 13.
oo Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501-02 (2oo8) ("Our due process cases,
on the contrary, have all involved awards subject in the first instance to state law.").
lOI Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (I99I) (Kennedy, I., concurring).
In Cooper Industries Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), the Court could
have answered the question regarding whether valuing punitive damages in a way to achieve
optimal deterrence was consistent with the damages' deterrence purpose. The Court, however,
"decided the constitutional question while trying to sidestep the substantive question about
the appropriate purpose of punitive damages." See Geistfeld, supra note 55, at 1114; see also
Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 439 ("[I]t is not at all obvious that even the deterrent function of
punitive damages can be served only by economically 'optimal deterrence."').
102 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 502.
103 Even though it lacks the authority, "[tihe Supreme Court now casts considerable
influence over the development of American tort law even though the Court traditionally left
it in the hands of state courts." Donald G. Gifford, The Constitutional Bounding of Adjudication:
A Fullerian) Explanation for the Supreme Court's Alass Tort Jurisprudence, 44 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1 1 o9,
1130 (2012).
104 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 476.
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which caused the plaintiffs' injuries. 1°5 The jury awarded the plaintiffs $287
million in compensatory damages. °6 The jury also imposed $5 billion in
punitive damages," 7 which the lower courts reduced to $2.5 billion by the
time the case reached the Supreme Court.108
The certiorari question that the Court granted in Exxon Shipping Co. was
based in maritime law, which is federal common law."9 It asked whether
the $2.5 billion punitive award "is greater than maritime law should
allow in the circumstances."" 0 Maritime law uses "the same principles as
courts of common law ... in allowing exemplary damages.""' Thus, the
certiorari question essentially asked whether the damages' punishment
and deterrence purposes justified the award at issue. Similarly, the common
law basis of the certiorari question provided the Court an opportunity to
review the general legitimacy of punitive damages and to consider "the
desirability of regulating [punitive damages] as a common law remedy." "I
The Court discussed the historical common law purposes of punitive
damages: punishing for "extraordinary wrongdoing" and deterring by setting
io5 Id. at 476-77, 480.
106 Id. at 480.
107 Id. at 481.
io8 Id.
io9 Id. at 489-o.
i o Id. at 476.
iii Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. joi, io8 (1893); see also Atl.
Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 411 (2009) ("The general rule that punitive
damages were available at common law extended to claims arising under federal maritime
law."); Richard Aaron Chastain, Cleaning Up Punitive Damages: A Statutory Solution for Unguided
Punitive-Damages Awards in Maritime Cases, 63 VAND. L. REV. 813, 822 (2OIO) ("As a general
rule, admiralty courts follow the general trend of the federal courts in nonmaritime cases,
viewing punitive damages as serving the dual roles of deterring others from engaging in
socially harmful conduct and of punishing-or, in language often used taking 'retribution'
against-the defendant."). Maritime and tort law have different limitations on the recovery of
compensatory damages, but nothing in the Court's opinion mentions these distinctions-nor
should it because limitations on compensatory damages do not control punitive damages'
common law purposes.
Even if the law were not the same, the Court's analysis does not look like it is based
in maritime law. See Lens, supra note 73, at 24-25 (arguing that Exxon Shipping Co. is not
really based in maritime law). See generally id. at 4 (arguing that the Court's predictability
analysis in Exxon Shipping Co. also implicates procedural due process concerns). The Court's
historical review of punitive damages and their purposes is based in general tort law. Id. at
44-45. Similarly, the studies that the Court used to reach its unpredictabiliry conclusion
were state tort law cases. Id. at 25-26; see also Bridgeport Harbor Place I, LLC v. Ganim,
No. Xo6CVo 4 oi84523 S, 2008 WL 4926925, at *12 n.13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2oo8) ("It
is noted that although the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Shipping concerned federal
maritime law, the Court reached its holding by analyzing and relying on punitive awards in
state court civil trials.").
112 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 502.
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an example."l 3 The Court confirmed that these common law purposes also
control today."1 4 Consistent with these purposes, the Court explained that
some defendants are more deserving of punitive damages than others; more
blameworthy conduct includes conduct that is intentional or malicious,
or conduct undertaken for profit."1 5 And, regardless of reprehensibility, a
higher punitive damage award may be justifiable if the defendant's conduct
is difficult to detect.
11 6
B. The Appearance of Justice Holmes's Bad Man
Unlike in its constitutional cases, in common law cases the Court has the
ability "to unleash its criticism of punitive damages as a policy matter. '17
The common law authority also enables the Court to describe its ideal
system of punitive damages. The Court did both.
As for the criticism, the Court discussed that even though "punitive
damages overall are higher and more frequent in the United States
than they are anywhere else,"' 8 the problem with them is not "mass-
produced runaway awards."" 9 Instead, the "real" problem is their "stark
unpredictability."'' 0 Using studies of the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages, the Court concluded that "the spread is great, and the outlier
cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding
compensatories."'' l And the factual differences between cases do not
explain the outliers. Anecdotally, the Court noted that the same facts
produced similar compensatory damage awards in two cases, but very
113 Id. at 491. A third historical justification was to compensate for intangible injuries, such
as pain and suffering, or mental anguish, which were not included in compensatory damages
at the time. Id. at 491-92. Intangible injuries were eventually included in compensatory
damages; for this reason, punitive damages are no longer needed to serve this purpose-nor
could this purpose justify their imposition. See id. at 492.
114 Id. at 492.
'15 ld. at 493-94.
I 16 Id. at 494.
117 Catherine M. Sharkey, Commentary, The Vicissitudes of Tort: A Response to Professors
Rabin, Sebok & Zipursky, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 695, 707-08 (zoI I).
1 i8 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 496.
I19 Id. at 497.
120 Id. at 499.
121 ld. at 500. Thus, the Court believed punitive damages to be unpredictable as far as
their relationship to the underlying compensatory damages. The authors of the study that
the Court used in Exxon Shipping Co. have criticized the Court's consideration of awards
with low compensatory damages, which will automatically have a very high ratio between
the compensatory and punitive damages-especially because the Court has otherwise stated
its approval of a high ratio if the compensatory damages are low. See Theodore Eisenberg et
al., lVariability in Punitive Damages: Empirically Assessing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 166 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 5, 12-23 (2010).
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different punitive damage awards-$4 million in one and zero in the
other.'
As for the ideal system, according to the Court:
a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that
even Justice Holmes's "bad man" can look ahead with some
ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of
action or another. And when the bad man's counterparts turn
up from time to time, the penalty scheme they face ought to
threaten them with a fair probability of suffering in like degree
when they wreak like damage. 1"3
As for the reforms to achieve this ideal system of imposing punitive
damages, the Court suggested a "quantified approach."'' 14 But it rejected
a hard cap because "there is no 'standard' tort or contract injury"' l5 and
because the legislature is better able to set hard caps and make adjustments
for inflation.2 6 The "more promising alternative," according to the Court,
is "pegging punitive to compensatory damages using a ratio or maximum
multiple."'2 7 The Court believed that the wisdom of such pegging is
demonstrated by the fact that many states have adopted ratio-based caps
on punitive damages and Congress also has passed legislation providing
treble damages.2 8
Turning to the proper ratio for the punitive damage award in Exxon
Shipping Co., the Court rejected a 3:1 ratio because the conduct in retaining
a known alcoholic captain was not malicious and egregious, was not
undertaken for profit, and would already subject the tortfeasor to regulatory
sanctions and compensatory damages.2 9 The Court also rejected a 2:1 ratio
because there was no need to provide an incentive to sue; the case involved
staggering environmental damage, obviously prompting government
reaction and tort lawsuits.3 0
Ultimately, the Court decided that something close to the median 1:1
ratio shown in studies was appropriate
3':
122 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 5oo-o1.
123 Id. at 502 (citation omitted).
124 Id. at 504. The Court first rejected using more refined jury instructions, finding
that they "can go just so far in promoting systemic consistency when awards are not tied to
specifically proven items of damage (the cost of medical treatment, say)." Id.
125 Id. at 5o6.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 507.
129 Id. at 510-i I.
130 Id. at 511 ("[ln this case [there was] staggering damage inevitably provoking
governmental enforcers to indict and any number of private parties to sue.").
131 Id. at 512-13.
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[A]wards at the median or lower ... roughly express jurors' sense
of reasonable penalties in cases with no earmarks of exceptional
blameworthiness within the punishable spectrum (cases like
this one, without intentional or malicious conduct, and without
behavior driven primarily by desire for gain, for example) and
cases (again like this one) without the modest economic harm or
odds of detection that have opened the door to higher awards.
13
The Court not only applied the 1:1 ratio to the punitive damage award
at issue in Exxon Shipping Co., but it also concluded that the 1:1 would be "a
fair upper limit in such maritime cases" with similar factual circumstances-
mainly a lower level of reprehensibility but high compensatory damages.
13
Practically, the Court wants Justice Holmes's bad man and his
counterparts to be aware that if they commit reckless conduct likely to
cause a substantial amount of damage, they will pay a punitive damage
award roughly equivalent to the awarded compensatory damages. It is
not surprising to see the Court cite Justice Holmes in Exxon Shipping Co.
The Court wanted to increase predictability, and Justice Holmes "waged
a lifelong campaign" to make the law more "knowable."' '3 But the Court's
citation to Justice Holmes's bad man within the punitive damages context
is a little strange given the reason that Justice Holmes introduced this
character.
C. The BadMan Briefly Explained
Justice Holmes's "bad man" is "arguably his most enduring contribution
to jurisprudence." 35 The bad man first appeared in a speech Justice Holmes
gave at the opening of the Boston University School of Law entitled The
Path of the Law, which was later reprinted in the Harvard Law Review. 
136
Justice Holmes introduced his bad man as part of his effort to better
understand law by separating it from morality, which some have criticized.
1. A Toolto Separate Law andMorality.-Justice Holmes's speech concerned
the study of law, which was not surprising given his audience. 37 Holmes
explained that the study of law is a profession because people hire lawyers
for advice.'38 "People want to know under what circumstances" they
could be brought into court and be subjected to judicial "judgments and
132 Id. at 513.
133 Id.
134 See Thomas C. Grey, Plotting The Path of the Law, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 19, 40-41
(1997).
135 Marco Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes's Bad Man, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069,
2073 (201 1).
136 Oliver Wendell Holmes, J., The Path oftheLaw, io HAuv. L. REv. 457 (1897).
137 Id. at 457.
138 Id.
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decrees."' 39 A lawyer's role is to predict those circumstances. Law is simply
"[tihe prophecies of what the courts will do."14 The object of the study of
law and the legal profession, then, is prediction.1
41
According to Justice Holmes, one of the things that most interferes
with the ability to predict legal outcomes is the confusion of legal and
moral ideas. 14 In fact, Justice Holmes advocated banishing "every word of
moral significance ... from the law altogether."'43 This would reveal laws,
which are "[tihe prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious.""4 To be able to better identify the law, Justice Holmes
introduced his bad man:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at
it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good
one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.4
s
Justice Holmes applied his theory to tort law. The confusion between
morality and law is apparent in the definition of a tort duty; the tendency
in defining it is to "fill the word with all the content which we draw from
morals."' 146 This is also how the good man would define it. The good man
will do the "right thing ... simply because it is the right thing to do,"'
147
even if it is not profitable to him. But this perspective does not tell us the
"law" as Justice Holmes defined it.
To define and understand a tort duty, according to Justice Holmes,
we must examine the bad man's perspective. From his perspective, duty
means that "if he does certain things he will be subjected to disagreeable
consequences by way of... compulsory payment of money."' 4 s Essentially,
"[i]f you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum."
'
149
According to Justice Holmes, the bad man's perspective shrinks
"the vague circumference of the notion of duty" and makes those same
circumferences "more precise."' 150 This precision results because the bad
139 Id.
140 Id. at 461.
141 Id.
142 Holmes, supra note 136, at 459 ("The law is full of phraseology drawn from morals,
and by the mere force of language continually invites us to pass from one domain to the other
without perceiving it[.]").
143 Id. at 464.
144 Id. at 461.
145 Id. at 459.
146 Id. at 461.
147 Jimenez, supra note 135, at 2079.
148 Id. at 2078 (quoting Holmes, supra note 136, at 461).
149 Holmes, supra note 136, at 462.
15o Id. at 461-62.
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man's perspective removes morality from the calculation.' 5 A tort duty
simply means a court's requirement that the bad man pay damages.
The bad man sees the damages that he is required to pay "as nothing
more than a tax on conduct."'s "[Riegarding damages as a tax... removels]
any moral onus from the conduct-the income tax doesn't mean that
earning an income is reprehensible, and thus the 'tort tax' doesn't mean that
tortious conduct is reprehensible."' 53 Thus, the bad man is not confused by
whether a duty depends upon his conduct being immoral; he understands
that the "duty" obligates him to pay the tax if he chooses to commit the
tort.154
2. No Concern for Enforcement Probabilities.-The reactions to Justice
Holmes's bad man have not been favorable. Generally, the bad man
is seen as a "calculating and amoral ... [character] who . . . 'cares only
for the material consequences' of his [conduct]."'' 55 The theory has also
been criticized as "advocating a legal system devoid of morality' 1 56 and as
"promotfing] immoral behavior by encouraging the bad man ... to choose a
course of conduct.., according to a cost-benefit analysis in which the bad
man chooses to engage in a given activity whenever the benefit of doing so
151 David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes's The
Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1567 (1997) ("[The bad man concept] is an attempt to
eliminate ... a confusion between reading moral words appearing in legal texts in their moral
sense, which suggests categorical obligations, and reading them in their legal sense, which
(Holmes claims) implies only disjunctive obligations.").
Justice Holmes's theories have greatly influenced tort law. Jimenez, supra note 135, at 2o88
(explaining that Holmes's bad man theory "revolutionized" tort law). The most prominent
example is the Learned Hand formula for determining whether conduct is negligent. The
formula weighs the probability and likely severity of harm that will result versus the costs of
taking precautions to avoid causing that harm. If the costs of taking precautions are less than
the multiplied harm, the conduct is negligent. This formula enables "the bad man to predict,
with a fair degree of accuracy, how a court would rule." Id. at 2095.
Ideally, Justice Holmes would have wanted to make the standard of reasonable care even
more specifically defined. See Grey, supra note 134, at 41 ("As part of his project of making the
law knowable, Holmes waged a lifelong campaign both as a commentator and judge to replace
the standard of reasonable care in the law of accidental injury with a set of more specific rules
defining properly safe conduct."); see, e.g., Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70
(1927) (defining a "standard of conduct" to be one where "if a driver cannot be sure otherwise
whether a train is dangerously near[,] he must stop and get out of the vehicle"). But see Pokora
v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934) (rejecting any perception that Goodman defined a
standard of conduct).
152 Luban, supra note 151, at 1565.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Jimenez, supra note 135, at 2073-74 (quoting Holmes, supra note 136, at 459).
156 Id. at 2071-72 (citing Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Layer, I io Hxav. L. REV.
1013, 1014 (1997)).
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exceeds the activity's legal cost."' 57 A common response to this criticism is
that Justice Holmes was not attempting to empower the bad man; instead,
he wanted legislatures to understand how the bad man thinks so that they
could create penalties that would actually affect the bad man's behavior
and, perhaps, turn him good.158
Ironically, another criticism of Justice Holmes's bad man argues that
he is really not that "bad." Instead, he is "a pretty tame and law abiding
bad man."' 59 Even though he evaluates the law in terms of its material
consequences, the bad man still accepts the fact that he will have to pay
those consequences if he violates the law. 160 The truly bad man, on the
other hand, would focus on the actual likelihood he will have to pay those
consequences.16' He would be just as interested in the "enforcement
probabilities" as he would be in the "enforcement outcomes."'
161
The bad man's failure to consider the likelihood of enforcement
probabilities also addresses a weakness in Justice Holmes's prediction
theory-that the law is a prophecy of what courts will do. This theory
assumes courts have the power to enforce their decisions. 163 Generally,
courts are powerless to enforce most damages awards. 164 They necessarily
rely on other branches of the government to enforce their decisions. Just
as the truly bad man would be concerned about enforcement probabilities,
157 Id.
158 Id. at 2079. Professor Jimenez argues that Justice Holmes's purpose was thus not to
celebrate the bad man, but to protect the good man. Id. at 21 11.
159 Luban, supra note 151, at 1571.
16o Id.; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law One
Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353, 368 (997) ("[S]omeone who murders a solitary
homeless person in an alley at 3:oo a.m. is likely to get away with it. The best prediction of
what the courts will do in fact is 'nothing.' Presumably the killing is unlawful, yet if Holmes'
definition of law were taken literally, it would not be.... A bad man does not care why legal
pronouncements are unenforced so long as they are."); Jill E. Fisch, The "Bad Man" Goes to
Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAm L. REV. 1593, 1597
(2oo6) ("I do not read Holmes as incorporating the risk of nonenforcement into the bad man's
calculation.").
161 Luban, supra note 151, at I571; see also Jack M. Beermann, Commentary, Holmes's
GoodMan:A Comment on Levinson and Balkin, 78 B.U. L. REV. 937, 944 (1998) ("[In addition
to the reaction of the courts, the bad man is likely to take into account the probability of
detection when deciding whether to obey the law."); Mark Geistfeld, Tort Law and Criminal
Behavior (Guns), 43 ARiz. L. REV. 311, 323 (2001) ("A behavioral assumption that realistically
accounts for the Holmesian bad man must consider issues of detection and enforcement.");
William Twining, Other People's Power: The Bad Man and English Positivism, 1897-1997, 63
BROOK. L. REV. 189, 207 n.62 (1997) ("In criminal cases, for example, the "realistic" bad man
contemplating a possibly unlawful act would be concerned with the likelihoods of observation,
complaint, investigation, detection, decisions to prosecute, plea bargains and pleas, verdicts on
questions of fact, procedural and jurisdictional issues, sanctions and so on.").
162 Luban, supra note 151, at 1571.
163 See id. at 1576-77.
164 Id. at 1576.
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he would also be more concerned about what the sheriff will do instead of
the court.
165
Regardless of the criticisms of Justice Holmes's bad man, the Supreme
Court cited the theory in its one unique opportunity to directly address
the underlying purposes of punitive damage awards. And with this citation,
the Court altered those common law punishment and deterrence purposes.
III. THE DEPLETED PURPOSES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES POST-
EXXON SHIPPING CO.
The use of Justice Holmes's bad man as the centerpiece for its ideal
punitive damage system "radical[ly] depart[s] from the principles that have
governed punitive damages for the last several hundred years."'166 More
precisely, the use of Justice Holmes's bad man undermines the damages'
common law punishment and deterrence purposes, leaving them without
substance.
Punitive damages' traditional punishment purpose is inextricably
linked to morality.167 Morality justifies the punishment and controls its
extent, 168 and the award itself expresses moral disapproval.'69 The damages'
deterrence purpose has always been less well-defined, leaving open the
possibility of it encompassing multiple deterrence concepts.
In Exxon Shipping Co., however, the Court threw this common law
tradition out the window.7 ° The punishment purpose of punitive damages
is no longer linked to morality, and the Court failed to connect the purpose
to any other basis. As for the deterrence purpose, the Court clarified that
it has no independent substance, specifically rejecting either an optimal or
complete deterrence basis.
165 Alschuler, supra note 16o, at 372 (explaining that the bad man should be more
interested in what the sheriff would do than what the courts would do); see also Luban, supra
note 151, at 1576-77.
I66 See Jimenez, supra note 135, at 2099-100.
167 Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1428 (1993) (explaining that punitive damages are one of the few legal
areas that "contravene the reigning impulse to disassociate law from morality"); see also supra
Part I.B.i.
i68 See Galanter & Luban, supra note 167, at 1428; see also supra Part I.B. i.
169 Galanter & Luban, supra note 167, at 1428 (characterizing punitive damages as
"perhaps the most important instrument in the legal repertoire for pronouncing moral
disapproval" and explaining that punitive damages "reinforce the notion of law as a realm of
moral achievement").
17o And as a reminder, "[the Supreme Court now casts considerable influence over the
development of American tort law." Gifford, supra note 103, at 1130.
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A. A Punishment Purpose Without Substance
The Court explained that the issue in Exxon Shipping Co. gave it the
chance to explore its "understanding of the place of punishment in modern
civil law." '171 Morality appeared only once in that exploration-in Justice
Stevens's dissent, where he concluded that "the jury could reasonably have
given expression to its 'moral condemnation' of Exxon's conduct in the
form of this award."'
72
The majority, on the other hand, reconceived the damages' punishment
purpose as unrelated to morality. As a part of this reconception, however,
the Court did not replace morality with any other principle. Instead, it left
the purpose lacking in substance.
1. Rejection of the Morality Basis of the Punishment Purpose.-The Court made
morality irrelevant to punitive damages and their punishment purpose in
numerous ways. The main way was the Court's citing Justice Holmes's
bad man as the centerpiece for the ideal system of imposing punitive
damages-a man who appreciates neither moral condemnation nor the
stigma traditionally associated with punitive damages. The Court also
made morality irrelevant within its own definition of punitive damages and
the factors it emphasized (and did not emphasize) in choosing the 1:1 ratio.
a. The Bad Man's Lack of Appreciation of Moral Condemnation
The Supreme Court has previously described punitive damages as a
mechanism by which the jury may express moral condemnation, but in
Exxon Shipping Co., it cited a man who does not appreciate morality. A
man who does not appreciate morality also does not appreciate the moral
condemnation that the jury expresses by imposing a punitive damage
award.
Common thought, however, is that punitive damages are one way to
reach the bad man173-the legislators should use punitive and "not just
compensatory damages" to affect the bad man's behavior.'74 The reason that
the bad man may be affected by punitive damages is not that he suddenly
appreciates the immorality of his conduct. Instead, the unpredictable
171 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 47i, 490 (2oo8).
172 Id. at 522 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173 Luban, supra note 151, at 1569 ("The existence of punitive damages ... clearly
indicates that the legal system is willing to punish bad men who treat compensation as merely
a cost of doing business."); see also Jimenez, supra note 135, at 2097-98 ("With the availability
of punitive damages, it seems, the bad man need not be indulged by the good people of this
world.").
174 Grey, supra note 134, at 54 (explaining that to reach the bad man legislatures should
look "to criminal penalties, punitive damages, or injunction, not just compensatory damages").
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damages may reach him because they preclude him from accurately
planning out the damages of his tortious conduct, perhaps dissuading him
from committing the conduct in the first place.'75 The Supreme Court's
insistence on predictability in Exxon Shipping Co. precludes the use of this
strategy of reaching the bad man.
However, even if the bad man could be surprised by the amount,
the bad man would not appreciate the moral connotation of the punitive
damage award. He sees a punitive damage award just like any other damage
award-as a tax on conduct.'76 If he injures someone, he already has to pay
one tax (i.e., compensatory damages). If his conduct is culpable enough, he
will have to pay one additional tax (i.e., punitive damages).177 But it is just
a tax, which does not communicate any message regarding the immorality
of his tortious conduct. 1 From the bad man's perspective, even "punitive"
damages are just part of the price tag of committing tortious conduct.
To use Justice Holmes's terms, the Court's citation to the bad man makes
the obligation to pay punitive damages disjunctive. This is what Justice
Holmes did with tort duties: "If you commit a tort, you are liable to pay a
compensatory sum."'79 But in Exxon Shipping Co., the Court altered this a
bit-if you commit a tort, you must pay a compensatory and punitive sum.
Notably, Justice Holmes did not apply his theory to criminal law, another
field intimately connected to morality 8 ° There, Holmes maintained the
morally based categorical prohibition: "Don't do the crime!"' 81 The Court
175 See Jimenez, supra note 135, at 2102 (using the Ford Pinto punitive damage case
as an example of a tortfeasor finding its predicted loss "less than reliable in significant part
due to the jury's imposition of punitive damages"); Grey, supra note 134, at 54 (arguing that
legislators should impose punitive damages for breach of contract because "behavior responds
to the incentive effects provided by remedies"). In Exxon Shipping Co., the Court rejected the
idea of using unpredictability to punish. Regardless, Justice Holmes's bad man is unaffected
by morality-based punishments; he would see punitive damages as just another amount of
damages he has to pay regardless of their unpredictability-similar to how the Court defines
punitive damages in Exxon Shipping Co. See infra Part III.A. I.c.
176 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
177 This perspective is similar to the Court's definition of punitive damages in Exxon
Shipping Co. See infra Part III.A.i.c.
178 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. Similarly, a fine does not carry the
same type of moral connotation that a punitive damage award (supposedly) carries. See infra
p. 30 and note 200.
179 Holmes, supra note 136, at 462; see also Luban, supra note 151, at 1565.
I8o See Holmes, supra note 136, at 461 ("Leav[e] the criminal law on one side .. ); see
also Luban, supra note 151, at 1566.
I81 Luban, supra note 151, at 1566. Professor Luban points to two possible reasons
Justice Holmes saw criminal law differently. The first is that the bad man would obviously
view imprisonment differently-as something more than a mere tax on conduct. Id. at 1566.
The second is that Justice Holmes believed in the "hereditarian notion of criminality,"
meaning that punishment would not deter criminals from committing crimes. Id. Justice
Holmes obviously did not apply his bad man theory to punitive damages. It is possible that
his belief in the hereditarian notion motivated this non-application.
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has consistently pointed to the similarities in the purposes of criminal law
and punitive damages,18 but applied the bad man's non-morality-based
disjunctive outlook to punitive damages.
b. The Bad Man's Immunity to Any Punitive Damages Stigma
Related to the jury's expression of moral condemnation is the stigma
traditionally associated with punitive damages. This stigma is what
separates compensatory and punitive damages in tort:
[U]nlike the term "punitive damages," the term "compensatory
damages" does not itself connote blameworthy conduct by the
defendant.
To award punitive damages, on the other hand, the jury
must find that the defendant acted maliciously, in "wanton
and reckless disregard for the rights of others," with "flagrant
indifference" to the rights of others, or in an "outrageous" manner.
The word "punitive," denoting punishment for wrongdoing,
is used to describe the award .... Thus, a punitive damages
award, unlike a compensatory award, seems always to constitute
a "badge of disgrace" and to jeopardize the defendant's good
name, reputation, honor, and integrity.183
The stigma punishes the tortfeasor independently and ensures that
punitive damages punish in a way other than just requiring the tortfeasor
to write a larger check.
182 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 504-06 (2oo8).
183 Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Casefor Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures,
69VA. L. REV. 269, 281-82 (1983) (footnotes omitted); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. I, 54 (991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Tihere is a stigma attached to an award
of punitive damages that does not accompany a purely compensatory award. The punitive
character of punitive damages means that there is more than just money at stake."). But see
Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
859, 879 (1991) ("Claims of any significant stigma are not very convincing .... "). Professor
Kahan did not draw an analogy between shaming penalties and the stigma resulting from
punitive damages in his article, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean? 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591
(1996), but others have. See Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts,
89 CALIF. L. REV. 231, 280 n.189 (2001) (noting that shame sanctions are generally associated
with criminal law, but a similar stigma can result from punitive damages); Galanter & Luban,
supra note 167, at 1444 ("[Tlhe aim of retributive punishment is to inflict expressive defeat
on wrongdoers. They are to be humbled, in order to repudiate publicly the moral falsehood
implicit in their behavior. Punishment on this view, must be public and must attempt to shame
the wrongdoer."); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Deserts, 31
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 316 (1998) ("Corporations often fear the adverse publicity that
accompanies punitive damages ... far more than the monetary costs. Being publicly labeled
as an endangerer of the public welfare is the functional equivalent of a shaming ceremony for
individuals."); cf. Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity-an Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction,
45 DEPAUL L. REV. 341, 357 (1996) (explaining that a lack of publicity of imposed punitive
damage awards hurts the damages' ability to punish) "Public condemnation and its attendant
sense of shame are integral to the concept of exacting retribution." Id.
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Any such stigma,"s however, does not exist in the theoretical world
of Justice Holmes's bad man because it does not create any material
consequences. Again, the bad man defines the law based on its material
consequences.18 And the alleged stigma associated with punitive damages
does not create any material consequence that would affect the bad man.
For comparison's sake, the stigma associated with a criminal conviction
creates material consequences. 86 For instance, a convict may have difficulty
obtaining employment as criminal convictions often have to be disclosed
when applying for employment. 87 Similarly, criminal convictions stay on a
defendant's record, 88 and convicted felons lose certain civil rights, like the
right to vote. 189
No similar material consequence results from the stigma that
accompanies a punitive damage award. Theoretically, the punitive
damages' "badge of disgrace" impairs the bad man's reputation and makes
members of the community want to avoid dealing with the bad man. 9° But
it is difficult to turn this theoretical consequence into a material one, which
is the only type of consequence that would affect the bad man.
The damage award in a defamation claim supports this argument. A
defamation claim compensates harm based on a decreased reputation. 91
Demonstrating actual harm or damage that would also constitute a material
consequence of a decreased reputation-for example, a loss of customers-
is notoriously difficult.1 92 To alleviate this difficulty, defamation law
presumes harm for some defamatory statements, mostly in cases where the
harm or damage is obvious despite the difficulty in proving it. 93 This does
not apply in all defamation cases. For instance, harm is not presumed when
184 Arguably, this stigma does not really exist anymore partly because of tort reform
efforts. See infra Part III.A.i.e.
185 Holmes, supra note 136, at 459.
186 Wheeler, supra note 183, at 283-84.
187 Id. at 283.
188 Riggs, supra note 183, at 889.
189 Wheeler, supra note 183, at 283. Professor Wheeler also discusses other differences
between the material consequences of a criminal conviction and a punitive damages award:
i) a criminal conviction can be used for impeachment purposes, but a punitive damage award
cannot; 2) convicted felons lose certain civil rights, but no such forfeiture occurs with punitive
damages; 3) lawyers can be disbarred for criminal convictions, but not punitive damage
awards; and 4) prior criminal convictions may be the basis for increased criminal sanctions in
later cases, but punitive damages awards lack this power. Id. at 283-84.
I90 Id. at 281-82.
i91 DoBBs,supra note 20, § 7.2(2), at 628.
192 Id. (explaining that presumed damages were the "central means by which" plaintiffs
were able to obtain relief).
193 Id. § 7.2(3), at 628-29 (explaining that presumed damages were always available for
libel, but with slander, only certain subject matter qualified for presumed damages).
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the defamatory statements accuse the defendant of general immoral but
non-criminal conduct.'
The notorious difficulty of establishing actual harm or damages in a
defamation claim also shows that any alleged reputational harm resulting
from a punitive damage award likely does not affect the defendant
materially. Simply put, it is difficult to show actual harm caused by a
damaged reputation. Even defamation law refuses to presume harm when
the defamatory statement accuses the defendant of immoral conduct-the
same message that the jury sends when it imposes punitive damages. There
may be general sentiment that a punitive damage award would hurt the
defendant's reputation, but this sentiment is not a material consequence.
And without a material consequence, like a loss of customers, the bad man
will not be punished or otherwise affected by any such stigma traditionally
associated with punitive damages.
c. No Reference to Morality in Defining Punitive Damages
According to the Court in Exxon Shipping Co., a punitive damage award is
just the amount that the defendant will have to pay if he commits a tortious
act.'95 This is the definition the Court uses to accompany its conclusion that
even Justice Holmes's bad man is entitled to some idea of what he will pay
before committing a tortious act.
What is notable in this definition is what is missing: any recognition of
the punishment purpose of punitive damages, or, similarly, the immorality
of the defendant's conduct and how it deserves punishment. The Court's
definition does not communicate to the defendant that the contemplated
tortious conduct is reprehensible or immoral, or that the defendant will be
"punished" in some extra way if he commits the contemplated tortious
conduct. Instead, it simply communicates the extra consequence if the bad
man opts to commit the conduct.96
The Court's "just the amount the defendant will have to pay" definition
also does not differentiate between compensatory and punitive damages;
194 Id. § 7.2(3), at 629 ("At some relatively recent time, a disputed number of common law
courts began to require proof of pecuniary loss in cases of 'libel per quod.'... [This] category
included cases in which the defamatory content of the publication could not be recognized by
a mere reading of the publication, that is, cases in which some added information was required
to see that the statement defamed someone.").
195 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 502 (2oo8) ("[A] penalty should be
reasonably predictable in its severity; so that even Justice Holmes's 'bad man' can look ahead
with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another.").
196 This focus on the consequence is similar to the disjunctive obligations that Justice
Holmes outlines. See Oliver Wendelle Holmes, J., The Path of Law, io HAiv. L. REV. 457, 462
(1897); David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmesr The
Path of Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547. i565 (1997).
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it could just as easily cover compensatory damages. 197 Both are just damage
awards that the defendant will have to pay if he commits tortious conduct.
The Court negates what differentiates punitive damages-the relevance
of morality and stigma.
d. No Consideration of Morality in Choosing the 1:1 Ratio
Mainly, the factors that the Exxon Court used to reduce the punitive
damage award and choose the 1:1 ratio were: 1) the defendant's previous
payment of civil fines, 2) the high compensatory damage award, and 3) the
perceived low level of reprehensibility of the conduct.198 None of these
factors, as the Court describes them, should be used to evaluate whether an
award is consistent with the damages' common law punishment purpose-
at least not if that punishment purpose is based in morality.'"
Regarding the first factor, payment of government fines, "punishment"
by fine and by punitive damages differ. The standard for imposing a fine
may not be morally based. This is also why fines are not thought to express
moral disapproval: "[Tihey are open to the interpretation that society is
attaching a price tag to, rather than prohibiting, the punished behavior:
we cannot condemn someone morally for buying what we are willing to
sell, even if we are charging a high price for it." ' For the same reason,
there is no chance a fine could stigmatize a defendant in the same way
punitive damages are thought to do. Moreover, even if fines did express
moral disapproval, they still differ because the fines do not express a jury's
197 The Court had previously differentiated between the two based on the jury's
perspective: compensatory damages are based on the "jury's assessment of the extent of a
plaintiff's injury... whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral
condemnation." Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
198 The Court first rejected a 3:1 ratio because the conduct "expos[ed] the tortfeasor to
certain regulatory sanctions and inevitable damages actions," resulted in "substantial recovery
for substantial injury," and was merely reckless. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 5to-11. The
Court also mentioned the high compensatory damage award when rejecting a possible
2:1 ratio, choosing the j:i ratio, and confirming the propriety of the i:i ratio based on its
conclusion that, constitutionally, a "single-digit maximum is appropriate" when compensatory
damages are substantial. Id. at 514-15. The Court also rejected a 2:1 ratio because there was no
need to incentivize private litigation because the "staggering damage inevitably provok[ed]
governmental enforcers to indict and any number of private parties to sue." Id. at 511. See
discussion infra Part III.B.i.c).
I99 True, the Court mentions that a i:i ratio "roughly express[es] jurors' sense
of reasonable penalties" in cases involving merely reckless conduct and a substantial
compensatory damage award. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 474. But this language does not
mirror the traditional language used to describe the moral condemnation/punishment purpose
of punitive damages. At the very least, the Court could have concluded that jurors use a 1:1
ratio to express their moral disapproval of the defendant's conduct when the conduct is merely
reckless but causes substantial damage.
2oo Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 38o-81 (i999).
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moral disapproval. And the defendant's previous payment of a fine would
not necessarily lessen the jury's moral disapproval; paying a fine after
the conduct does not make the initial conduct less immoral. In all, the
government's imposition of fines and the defendant's payment of the same
do not make the defendant's conduct less deserving of punitive damages'
morality-based punishment, but the Court uses this factor to reduce the
award. 01
Similarly, the high compensatory damage award does not make the
defendant's conduct less deserving of morality-based punishment. The
availability and measurement of compensatory damages does not depend
on morality. The jury cannot express its moral condemnation through the
compensatory damage award; it cannot award more because the defendant's
conduct was malicious as opposed to reckless, especially not in a case based
on economic compensatory damages like Exxon Shipping Co. And like a
fine, there is no chance that the compensatory damage award will create
a punishing stigma. 02 Again though, the Court used this factor to reduce
the award.
Unlike the other factors the Court considered in choosing the 1:1
ratio, the last factor, the level of reprehensibility, can be relevant to the
damages' common law punishment purpose. Generally, reckless conduct
is less immoral than malicious or purposeful conduct, making a less severe
punishment appropriate. But the way the Court used this factor does not
acknowledge the common law's emphasis on morality.
Just as it held in its constitutional review of punitive damages, the
Court assumed that because the conduct was "reckless," reduction of the
punitive damage award was appropriate. In common law review, however, a
finding of recklessness should not automatically require reduction because
it does not necessarily mean less immorality. The conduct in Exxon Shipping
Co. is a perfect example of this because it lacks an intentional version. 03
Luckily, there is little chance of a defendant intentionally causing one of
201 The amount of related public penalties is relevant to optimal deterrence, which
mandates subtracting the amount of the public penalties from the level of punitive damages.
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 30, at 927 ("If punitive damages are not reduced from the
amount implied by our formula to reflect public penalties borne by the defendant, the
defendant's combined private and public payments would result in his expected payments
exceeding the harm done.").
202 See supra Part IV.A.i.b.
203 This is another reason why the level of reprehensibility constitutional guidepost is
difficult to apply. Originally, the Supreme Court labeled this guidepost as the most important.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). That importance appears to have
waned, likely because of the difficulty in applying it. Even though intentional conduct should
be punished more severely than reckless conduct, the guidepost does not quantify the proper
severity. And if conduct lacks an intentional version, does that automatically mean the conduct
should be punished less than other, unrelated intentional conduct? Should reckless conduct
causing extreme economic damage, like the conduct in Exxon Shipping Co., really be punished
less severely than intentional conduct causing minimal economic damage?
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the greatest environmental disasters ever."° The conduct will only ever
be reckless. Thus, although reckless, the defendant's conduct in Exxon
Shipping Co. was at its most immoral possibility. The jury's level of moral
disapproval may reasonably have been at its highest level."' 5 The Court
did not entertain this possibility and instead apparently assumed that a
recklessness categorization mandates reduction.
Although it did not admit it, it is possible that the Court simply
disagreed with the original jury's determination of the immorality of the
conduct; ultimately, the Court reduced the punitive damage award to
about one tenth of what the jury imposed.116 This trumping of the jury's
judgment, however, would be inappropriate, especially given the possible
reasonableness of that judgment.0 7 As the Court has explained, the amount
of a punitive damage award is left to the jury's discretion, and the trial court
reviews that amount to ensure it is reasonable. 0 8 The appellate court then
reviews the trial court's determination for an abuse of discretion. 0 9 There
is no room within this standard of review for the Court to substitute its
own conclusions on the morality of the defendant's conduct."0 The Court
certainly does not admit to this substitution, if that is what occurred. The
majority also did not identify the standard of review it used in choosing the
1:1 ratio.
A common law review of a punitive damage award should evaluate
whether an award is consistent with the damages' common law purposes,
including the morality-based punishment purpose. The Court purported
to perform a common law review in Exxon Shipping Co., but it used three
factors that are not relevant to whether the defendant's conduct was
204 DOBBS, supra note 20, § 3. I(3), at 325 ("Owners of oil tankers do not really desire to
discharge their valuable commodity into the public waters; this is not a profit-making activity
for them.").
205 See Calandrillo, supra note 98, at 807 ("The fact that Exxon knew about Captain
Hazelwood's history of alcoholism but did little about it evidently did not sit well with the
jury, or with most Americans for that matter.").
2o6 Id. at 791. The Court emphasized that it treated the defendant's conduct
"categorically as one of recklessness, for that was the jury's finding," and that it did not mean
to suggest that the conduct was "less than reprehensible." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554
U.S. 471, 51o n.23 (2oo8).
207 Justice Stevens affirmed the award in his dissent using an abuse of discretion
standard of review. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 522 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
2o8 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (991).
209 Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001 ) ("If no constitutional
issue is raised, the role of the appellate court, at least in the federal system, is merely to review
the trial court's 'determination under an abuse-of-discretion standard."'). But see id. at 437
("[T]he level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury.") (citations omitted).
21 o This type of trumping of the jury's judgment makes sense in a constitutional review
of a punitive damage award, where the standard of review is de novo, but not in a review for
abuse of discretion. See id. at 434-36.
2012-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
immoral and thus deserving of punishment. Effectively, the Court negated
morality's relevance to punitive damages' punishment purpose.
e. The Court's Previous De-emphasis of Morality
The Court's analysis in Exxon Shipping Co. is not the first time it has
deemphasized the role of morality within punitive damages. Long before
Exxon Shipping Co., the Court's criticism and reduction of punitive damage
awards helped diminish the effect of any morality-based stigma associated
with punitive damages.
Justice O'Connor was one of the most vocal critics of punitive damages
in the Court's early cases reviewing the constitutionality of punitive
damage awards."1 ' As early as 1989, Justice O'Connor stated that punitive
damage awards were "skyrocketing," and noted "[tihe threat of such
enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development
of new products." ' She also warned that juries might use the damages
to "target unpopular defendants, penalize unorthodox or controversial
views, and redistribute wealth," as well as to inflict "[m]ultimillion dollar
losses.., on a whim." '13 She was especially concerned about awards imposed
on corporations because juries were unlikely to view them "with much
sympathy" and might seek to redistribute wealth from large, especially
out-of-state, corporations to the needy plaintiff.'1
4
The tort reform movement espouses similar criticism.2 15 The focus
of the current tort reform movement is "how lawsuit abuse by ordinary
Americans [is] creating a tort tax on businesses impacting all Americans."
2 1 6
It frames plaintiffs' trial lawyers as "seeking only to redistribute wealth
from corporations to greedy widows and children." '17 It also highlights
the frivolousness of claims and how irresponsible juries are biased against
2 11 Hubbard, supra note 32, at 396 ("Justice O'Connor and the other members of the
majority simply accepted, without any critical analysis, the rhetoric used by the 'tort reform'
movement in its push for a wide range of changes in tort law to favor defendants in tort
litigation.").
212 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
213 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 43 (O'Connor J., dissenting) (criticizing the lack of procedural
protections in the imposition of punitive damages).
214 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 491 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
215 See Michael L. Rustad, The Endless Campaign: How the Tort Reformers Successfully and
Incessantly Market Their Groupthink to the Rest of Us, in MATERIALS ON TORT REFORM 33, 36-38
(Andrew E Popper ed., 2oIo). Professor Rustad labels the current tort reform movement "one
of the most successful social movements in American history." Id. at 34.
2 16 Id. at 36.
217 Id. at 37; Joan Vogel, The Tort Reform Movement as a Teaching Vehicle, in MATERIALS
ON TORT REFORM 26, 26 (Andrew F. Popper ed., 201O) ("The Tort Reform Movement has
also convinced many Americans that tort remedies need to be scaled back to prevent greedy
plaintiffs' attorneys and undeserving plaintiffs from wrecking the American economy.").
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wealthy defendants and "bestow windfalls on undeserving plaintiffs."1 8
The current tort system "costs an alarming drain on national wealth ...
stifles enterprise and innovation . . . and undermine[s] the international
competitiveness of American businesses." ' 9
In addition to its criticism of punitive damage awards, the Court has
dramatically altered the constitutional review of those same awards in
the past twenty years.2 0 In every case in which the Court has applied its
constitutional guideposts, the Court has either reduced or ordered the
reduction of the punitive damage award at issue.21
This criticism and reduction of punitive damages has affected the
condemnatory power of a punitive damage award.22 The power of an
award depends on the public's reaction to it."23 If the public does not
think less of a defendant because it is forced to pay punitive damages,
the award loses much of its power. No longer does the public question
the defendant's integrity like the traditional stigma assumes.2 4 Instead, the
public questions the legitimacy of the punitive damage award imposed.
218 Rustad, supra note 215, at 38.
219 Id.
220 See supra Part II.C. I (detailing the Court's constitutional guideposts).
221 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428-29 (2003); BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996). Like the Court, legislatures have been
active in reforming punitive damages. A total of twenty-six states have set caps on punitive
damages. See Thomas J. Miceli & Michael P. Stone, The Determinants of State-Level Caps on
Punitive Damages: Theory and Evidence 12-13, (Univ. of Conn. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper
No. 2010-25, 201 o), available at http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2o 10-2 5 .pdf (indicating
that twenty-four states have passed punitive damage caps); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
32-53o(A) (Supp. 2oi I) (capping punitive damages at the greater of three times the amount
of compensatory damages or $5oo,ooo); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-39-104(a)(5) (2012) (capping
punitive damages at the greater of two times the amount of compensatory damages or
$500,000).
222 See L. Song Richardson, When Human Experimentation Is Criminal, 99 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 89, 114-1 5 (2009) ("[Plunitive damages are the subject of negative portrayals in
the media as a result of the tort reform movement. The archetype stories of frivolous lawsuits
that are rewarded by out-of-control juries paint punitive damages awards as abuses of the
legal system."); Id. at 115 ("If reduced, the resulting damages may no longer humble and
shame the offender. Indeed, the reduction may even vindicate the wrongdoer."). This does
not mean that the Court's reductions were improper, just that even a constitutionally required
reduction of a punitive damage award affects the public's perception of the defendant.
223 Wheeler, supra note 183, at 281-82. Butsee Note, Shame, Stigma, andCrime: Evaluating
the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal Law, I16 Ha~v. L. REV. 2186, 2 194-95 (2003)
(explaining that even if the public is not aware that the shamed offender has been shamed, he
"nonetheless constantly faces the possibility that some know his 'true' status.").
224 Another reason that punitive damages likely lack the stigma today that they may
have once had is the commercial context in which punitive damages are most commonly
awarded. "[Tihe beneficiaries of punitive damages are often business plaintiffs suing business
defendants." Neil Vidmar & Mirya Holman, The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportionality of
Jury Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2oo5: A New Audit, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 855,
866 (201 O); see also DOBBS, supra note 20, § 3. I(i), at 317 ("In the x98os, most punitive awards
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This change is evident in the public's reaction to one of the most famous
cases highlighted in the tort reform movement: Liebeck v. McDonald's.2 5
McDonald's had received over 700 complaints from people burnt by its
coffee, but made no adjustment to the temperature-even though it was hot
enough to cause third-degree burns within three seconds of touching and
was hotter than coffee served by other fast-food and coffee restaurants.
2 6
When someone who suffered third-degree burns due to exposure to the
coffee sued, the jury imposed a punitive damage award based on the profits
McDonald's earned from just two days of selling its coffee. 2 7
What was the public's reaction to the jury's moral condemnation
of McDonald's conduct? That the jury unfairly imposed a $2.9 million
punitive damage award on McDonald's for a clumsy old woman spilling
coffee on herself.2 ' The public was not outraged at McDonald's for its
immoral conduct. McDonald's integrity or honor was not damaged, and no
stigma materially affected McDonald's."2 9 Instead, public reaction actually
favored McDonald's 3 -- the opposite of what the traditional morality-
based punishment purpose intended.
seem to have been made in economic tort cases, such as cases of wrongful discharge, bad faith
business dealings, or interference with contract."). The economic context of these punitive
damage awards tends to downplay any moral stigma attached to an award; cases between two
businesses are seen just as business conflicts.
225 Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., PTS., Inc., No. CV-93-o2419, 1995 WL 360309
(N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. I8, 1994), vacated sub nom. Liebeck v. Rests., 1994 WL 16777704 (N.M.
Dist. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994); see Rustad, supra note 215, at 33 ("Tort reformers are not embarrassed
to cite the McDonald's hot coffee case as an example of random, 'jackpot justice.' The case
became familiar to the public as an example of a tort world out of control.").
226 Vogel, supra note 217, at 2 7.
227 Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree. How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is Worth $2.9
Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Ai.
228 See Vogel, supra note 217, at 28.
229 McDonald's did not suffer any appreciable drop in its stock price around the time of
the punitive damage verdict. At the end of July 1994, its stock price was $13.56. McDonald's
Corp., MSN MONEY, http://investing.money.msn.com/investments/charts/?symbol=MCD#sy
mbol=MCD&event=&BB=off&CCI=off&EMA=off&FSO=off&MACD=off&MFI=off&P
SAR=off&RSI=off&SMA=off&SSO=off&Volume=off&period=Custom&linetype=Line&s
cale=Auto&dates=6/'i/994,8/I/l995&comparelist=$indu,$compx,$inx (last visited Apr. 15,
2013). The verdict was announced on August i8, 1994. Liebeck, 1995 WL 360309, at *I. At
the end of August, McDonald's stock price was $14.13. The stock price did drop to $13.19
at the end of September, but it rebounded to $14.44 at the end of October and ascended to
over $16.oo by the end of January 1995 and over $19.oo by the end of July 1995. Id. Similarly,
McDonald's did not experience any drop in its quarterly revenue. McDonald's Corp., Annual
Report (Form i o-K) (Mar. 29, 1995). Its quarterly revenue, in millions of dollars, was as follows:
$2,029.30 in June 1994, $2,225.40 in September 1994, and $2,270. 10 in December 1994. Id.
230 See, e.g., A Hot Issue, TEA & COFFEE TRADE J., Sept. I, 1995, available at 1995 WLNR
5603513 ("Public opinion polls show that most Americans felt the McDonald's case
was frivolous."); Gerlin, supra note 227, at Ai (indicating both that public opinion was on
McDonald's side and that polls have shown a majority of Americans were outraged by the
$2.9 million verdict).
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2. Failure to Replace the Substance of the Damages' Punishment Purpose.-
"Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special
social convention that signifies moral condemnation. ' 231 Without the
connection to morality, it is not clear that punitive damages even constitute
"punishment."2 32
Even if punitive damages still constitute a "punishment," however,
without morality, there is no basis for imposing that punishment. Pretend
"every word of moral significance" was banished from the punitive damages
field. 233 Without words like "malice," there is no definition of the type of
conduct that deserves punishment. Similarly, there is no definition of when
more severe punishment is appropriate. The Court's analysis removes
words like "malice" from the punitive damages equation, but it does not
replace those words with anything else-leaving no standard for imposing
the punishment.
Similarly, even if punitive damages still constitute a "punishment,"
how exactly the damages punish is unclear given the loss of the stigma.
2 34
231 Kahan, supra note 24, at 593. In his article What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
Professor Kahan advocated shaming penalties as an alternative to imprisonment. See id. at
635. But see Dan M. Kahan, What's Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEx. L. REV. 2075,
2075 (2006) (recanting his former support for criminal shaming penalties as an alternative to
imprisonment).
232 See Richardson, supra note 222, at 107 (summarizing philosopher Joel Feinberg's
well-known formulation of punishment, which defines a "necessary condition of punishment"
as one that "expresses censure, judgment, and disapproval in a socially conventional matter");
see also Kahan, supra note 24, at 636 ("[T]he expression of condemnation is at least as central
to shaming penalties as the infliction of shame itself."). Professor Kahan explained that a
shaming penalty still expresses shame even if the offender does not experience shame:
The public's realization that not all offenders view such punishments as
disgraceful, however, does not diminish the resonance of either shaming penalties
or imprisonment as symbols of the community's moral disapproval. If anything, the
perception that the offender is not shamed by what is commonly understood to be
shamefulwould reinforce onlookers' conclusion that he is depraved and worthy of
condemnation.
Id.
233 Holmes, supra note 136, at 464. For example, Justice Holmes pointed to the word
"malice" within defamation. Id. at 463. Malice carries with it moral connotations, but those evil
intent type connotations have nothing to do with the meaning of malice within defamation,
which asks only whether the defendant was aware of the falsity of the statement. Id.
Although he does not address it, it is possible that Justice Holmes would not advocate
banishing words of moral significance from the punitive damage context because they
properly refer to the defendant's mindset. Because the words refer strictly to the defendant's
mindset, these references may not have troubled Justice Holmes. See id. Thus, his concern
about confusing morality and the law may not apply to the use of "malice" within punitive
damages law. If the Court was assuming this non-application when it cited Justice Holmes's
bad man in Exxon Shipping Co., it did not explain so.
234 Even if an offender is not shamed by a shaming penalty, the shaming penalty is still
effective because it creates a stigma. Kahan, supra note 24, at 636-37 (describing that the
expression of moral condemnation alone is valuable because it translates into a "degradation
penalt[y]" and "lower[s] the offender's social status within that community"). "It is not a
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Damages lacking any moral connotation will not cause the public to look
at the defendant any differently. Regardless though, the Court refers to
a tortfeasor who, guaranteed, will not be affected by a stigma; Justice
Holmes's bad man, the centerpiece of the Court's ideal punitive damages,
does not appreciate any morally based stigma that fails to create a material
consequence.
Under the Court's conception of punishment, punitive damages are
basically a fine-another check for the bad man to write after committing
tortious conduct, 3 ' but with no clear aim in its imposition. This is a far
cry from the traditional thought that punitive damages reflect moral
condemnation.
B. A Hollow Idea of Deterrence
Before Exxon Shipping Co., the Court discussed punitive damages'
deterrence purpose in vague terms and determined it insufficient to justify
the amount of a punitive award.2 36 Exxon Shipping Co. gave the Court an
opportunity to explore the common law deterrence purpose and give it
some independent substance. 37
The Court, however, declined to give it any substance, much less
independent substance. In fact, the Court clarified that the purpose does
not include optimal and complete deterrence by assuming away issues
related to under-detection and under-enforcement and by imposing
punitive damages despite guaranteed liability. More than ever, punitive
damages' deterrence purpose rings hollow.
1. Ultimate Rejection of Optimal and Complete Deterrence.-Before Exxon
Shipping Co., the Court did not seem too keen on the use of punitive
damages to achieve either optimal or complete deterrence. Both theories
condition of a successful degradation ceremony that it induce any particular belief or emotion
on the part of the offender." Id. at 636. However, Justice Holmes's bad man is immune to any
type of stigma resulting from punitive damages because the stigma fails to create a material
consequence. See supra Part IVA. i.b.
235 See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal for
Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 38o-81 (i999) (discussing that
fines are not morally based).
236 See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
237 See Colby, supra note 24, at 458 n.292 ("That the Court has not abandoned the
deterrence rationale for punitive damages is clear from its opinion in Exxon Shipping Co.
The Court's very mention of Justice Holmes hints at an economics-based deterrence focus; in
the same speech in which Justice Holmes introduced his bad man, he explained that "every
lawyer ought to seek an understanding of economics." See Holmes, supra note 136, at 474; see
also Calandrillo, supra note 98, at 820 (advocating that the Court reject approaches to punitive
damages based on "gut reactions.., in response to morally reprehensible behavior" as "legal
legends like Oliver Wendell Holmes[] have recognized that we need to separate emotion from
the law in order to create law that makes sense").
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attempt to fix the problems of under-detection and under-enforcement
by increasing punitive damages based on the chances of escaping liability,
which appears unconstitutional after Philip Morris.
38
Exxon Shipping Co. clarifies that, even if constitutional, both theories
are inconsistent with the damages' common law deterrence purpose. Even
though improving predictability is consistent with optimal deterrence,
and possibly even complete deterrence, the Court otherwise rejects the
common element of both theories-increasing damages based on the
possibilities of under-detection or under-enforcement. Justice Holmes's
relatively tame bad man does not consider the possibilities, and the Court
similarly assumes them away. Separately, the Court also rejects optimal
deterrence by affirming the imposition of punitive damages in Exxon
Shipping Co.
a. The Relevance of Predictability
One initial reaction to Exxon Shipping Co. was that its focus on
predictability crippled the deterrence purpose of punitive damages. "It is
the unpredictability of punitive damages that in some instances, at least,
gives them their greatest deterrent effect." 3 9 This position is debatable,
however. Many believe that predictability actually increases the deterrent
effect.1
40
238 See supra Part II.C.2.
239 Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages After Exxon Shipping Company v. Baker: The
Quest for Predictability and the Role of Juries, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. i82, 198 (2009); see also Brian
Timothy Beasley, North Carolina's New Punitive Damages Statute: Who's Being Punished, Anyway?,
7 4 N.C. L. REV. 2174, 2198 (1996) ("If awards become predictable, large wealthy corporations
may include them as a cost of doing business and thus will not be deterred from marketing
unsafe products."); Rendleman, supra note 86, at 19 ("[Tlhe possibility of a large but
randomized sanction may also deter a potential miscreant."); Amelia J. Toy, Statutory Punitive
Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 324-26 (1991)
(arguing that "unpredictability is the essence of deterrence"); Paul J. Zwier, Due Process and
Punitive Damages, 1991 UTAH. L. REV. 407, 422-23 ("[Tjhe only deterrence for the bad-faith
tactic is the uncertainty of punitive damages. Certainty in punitive damages would not deter
bad-faith conduct."). Similarly, enabling tortfeasors to plan for punitive damages as a cost of
doing business negates any punishment effect-discouraging the conduct by imposing higher
costs neutralizes the message that the defendant should not commit the conduct because of
its immorality.
240 See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the argument that only "wildly unpredictable" awards could best
achieve deterrence). In the criminal context, the Court has noted the deterrent effect of a
criminal punishment depends both on the amount and the certainty of the penalty. Harmelin
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 354 n.124 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring) ("For capital punishment to deter anybody it must be a certain result
of a criminal act,... and it is not."); see also E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter
Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053 , 1o62 (1989) ("In the criminal law, it is
generally recognized that three factors increase the deterrent effect of sanctions: swiftness,
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Predictability, moreover, is actually required for optimal deterrence.
"Uncertainty is inconsistent with optimal deterrence because it imposes
additional costs, beyond the expected penalty itself, and could make it
impossible for potential tortfeasors or their insurers to predict liability in
order to decide whether proceeding despite the risk of liability would
be profitable."' 4' Uncertainty results in overdeterrence, which will cause
would-be defendants to undertake excessive precautions and pass those
costs on to consumers, or perhaps deter would-be defendants from even
undertaking the activity' To avoid overdeterrence, optimal deterrence
injects more certainty and predictability into punitive damages.1
43
Also, increasing predictability is not necessarily inconsistent with
complete deterrence. Unlike optimal deterrence, complete deterrence is
not concerned with the possibility of overdeterrence-thus, there is no
need to eliminate uncertainty and unpredictability.2 44 At the same time,
making the damages more predictable should not interfere with achieving
complete deterrence. And predictability may also increase naturally if the
jury were to use the gain-elimination formula. 4 Thus, the Court's focus
certainty, and magnitude."). And in the "fierce debates" over the federal criminal sentencing
guidelines, which increase predictability, "no serious consideration appears to have been given
to the possibility that increasing certainty might undercut deterrence." Tom Baker et al., The
Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An ExperimentalApproach, 89 IowA L. REV. 443, 451-52 (2004).
The Court has also discussed the effect of certainty on deterrence in other contexts. For
example, the Court has mentioned that the unpredictable enforcement of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedural Rule i i sanctions for frivolous filings has hurt the sanctions' deterrent effect.
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,392-93 (1990). Also, the "primary rationale for
the exclusionary rule is to deter official misconduct." Jarvis v. United States, 435 U.S. 934, 936
0978). The Court has often commented on the need to provide specific guidance to police
officers to achieve that deterrence. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-1 4 (1979). For
general arguments that predictability is consistent with deterrence, see Elliott, supra note 239,
at 1058 ("[O]nly information about the liability consequences of specific practices or modes
of engaging in the activity is likely to enhance specific predictability and thereby shape the
way that the activity is conducted."); Schwartz, supra note 65, at 141 ("From a deterrence
standpoint, it confounds understanding to permit such vast uncertainty as to the level of the
expected penalty.").
241 Scheiner, supra note z6, at 178.
242 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
243 Whether the cost-internalization measurement of optimal deterrence actually
achieves predictability is debatable given that it assumes pre-tort knowledge of the amount
of compensatory damages. The amount of compensatory damages, however, is likely not
knowable to the defendant before commission of the tort because it depends on "the specific
plaintiff, her circumstances, and her injury." Lens, supra note 73, at 39. In Exxon Shipping Co.,
the Court similarly (and mistakenly) assumed that the amount of compensatory damages is
knowable in concluding that its ratio system would provide predictability. Id. at 38-39.
244 Scheiner, supra note 26, at 178 ("If the goal is total deterrence, then overdeterrence
is impossible....").
245 See Lens, supra note 73, at 66-70 (advocating a gain-based measurement of punitive
damages and arguing it would achieve predictability). The gain-elimination formula, however,
sets only a minimum, leaving room for higher, unpredictable awards.
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on predictability is actually consistent with optimal deterrence and not
inconsistent with complete deterrence.
b. Under-Detection and Under-Enforcement? No problem.
Both optimal and complete deterrence theories conclude that punitive
damages cannot achieve deterrence unless the damages are increased
to reflect the possibility of escaping liability, whether because of under-
detection or under-enforcement. 246 If the defendant has a 50% chance of
escaping liability, his punitive damage award, whether based on the harm
caused to the plaintiff or the defendant's gain depending on the theory,
should be doubled.
Just like it has in its constitutional cases, the Court appeared to agree
in Exxon Shipping Co.147 Once again, the Court recycled its higher ratio
language: "[H]eavier punitive awards have been thought to be justifiable
when wrongdoing is hard to detect (increasing chances of getting away
with it) or when the value of injury and the corresponding compensatory
award are small (providing low incentives to sue)."1
48
The Court's description of its ideal system, however, assumes away
concerns related to under-detection and under-enforcement. The Court
wants punitive damages to be "reasonably predictable" so that Justice
Holmes's bad man, and the next bad men, understand "the stakes ...
in choosing one course of action or another."' 49 This described thought
process assumes that the bad man will pay damages if he commits the
tortious conduct, including punitive damages. This thought process does
not consider the likelihood of escaping liability or the likelihood of not
having to pay punitive damages. The "stakes" for the bad man include
punitive damages, which is why the Court focuses on making the amount
of these damages knowable pre-tort.
The Court's analysis tracks Justice Holmes's. His bad man also assumed
that he would have to pay damages if he committed a tort. The bad man's
failure to account for the possibility that he may not have to pay damages
is why some have labeled him "tame. 2 0 The Court takes the assumption
a step further though-also assuming that the bad man will pay punitive
damages despite the multiple factors that must fall into place for the
246 See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
247 Sharkey, supra note 60, at 21 ("By rejecting the under-detection rationale in the case
at hand, the Court both affirmed the relevance of the economic justification and implicitly
sided with the loss-internalization model over that of the gain-elimination model....").
248 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494 (2oo8) (citations omitted). Of course,
the Court has never actually applied this notion in its prior mentions. See supra notes 77-79
and accompanying text.
249 Exxon Shipping CO., 554 U.S. at 502.
25o Luban, supra note 151, at 1571.
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damages to be imposed. These factors include the plaintiff requesting
punitive damages, the judge allowing the plaintiff to submit that request
to the jury, the plaintiff convincing the jury to impose the damages 5 ' the
court not reducing the damages, etc.
Any assumption that the bad man will pay damages if he commits
tortious conduct rejects the shared premise of optimal and complete
deterrence. Again, both theories conclude that deterrence cannot be
achieved unless damages are increased based on the chances of escaping
liability. The Court, however, like Justice Holmes's bad man, does not
acknowledge the relevance of the chances of escaping liability. The Court's
current conception of punitive damages' deterrence purpose thus includes
neither optimal nor complete deterrence.
c. Imposing Punitive Damages Despite Guaranteed Liability
In Exxon Shipping Co., the Court specifically concluded that the
defendant had no chance of escaping liability, 5 but the Court still affirmed
the imposition of punitive damages. Granted, the Court reduced the award
consistent with its chosen 1:1 punitive to compensatory damage ratio, but
it still imposed an award despite guaranteed liability.
251 See DoBBS, supra note 20, § 3.11(), at 314 ("If the facts justify submitting the punitive
damages issue to the jury, the jury is free to make the award, to limit it, or to deny it altogether,
even if the facts show egregious misconduct by the defendant."); see, e.g., Scheuerman &
Franze, supra note 93, at I 167-69 n. 134-39 (describing the punitive damage jury instructions
from Alabama, Missouri, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia, all of which instruct the jury that
it has the discretion whether to award punitive damages at all).
The Exxon Shipping Co. Court acknowledged the jury's discretion over imposition; this
discretion is actually the basis of the unpredictability in the anecdotal evidence that the Court
mentions-the comparison between the $4 million punitive damage award in BMW and the
refusal to award any punitive damages in a case with similar facts. The Court does not connect
how, as long as the jury retains this discretion, punitive damages will remain unpredictable to
some extent. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 4 9 9 U.S. 1, 43 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Even if a ratio-type system could help fix predictability issues related to the amount of the
award, two distinct possibilities will remain: either the jury will award that amount or the jury
will not award any punitive damages.
Polinsky and Shavell do not specifically identify the jury's discretion in imposing punitive
damages as a possible basis for under-detection or under-enforcement; nor should they, since
their "escaping liability" analysis assumes liability for compensatory damages. After the
defendant is sued and the jury is considering whether to award punitive damages, however,
both optimal and complete theories assume that the jury will impose punitive damages. See
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 30, app. at 957-59 (listing model jury instructions, which do
not include the traditional "you may award punitive damages" language). If the jury retained
discretion over whether to impose, the defendant would always have a chance of not paying
any damages, preventing the achievement of either optimal or complete deterrence because
the defendant would not always end up paying the total harm caused or be stripped of the
total gain, respectively.
252 See Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 511.
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This result is inconsistent with optimal deterrence. Under optimal
deterrence, if the tortfeasor "has virtually no chance of escaping liability,"
25 3
meaning there is no chance of under-detection or under-enforcement,
punitive damages would be inappropriate.25 If liability is guaranteed, the
defendant will pay for all of the harm it causes and no additional damages
are needed to achieve the proper level of deterrence. Any punitive damages
imposed would cause overdeterrence, a socially undesirable result. If the
Court wanted to embrace optimal deterrence as a part of punitive damages'
common law deterrence purpose, it should not have imposed any punitive
damages given the chances of overdeterrence.2 5 s
The Court's willingness to impose punitive damages despite the
guaranteed liability is, however, consistent with complete deterrence,
which allows damages despite guaranteed liability to ensure that the
tortfeasor is completely stripped of any gain.116 Still, the Court's analysis
of the deterrence purpose in Exxon Shipping Co. does not otherwise track
complete deterrence, as the Court does not begin with or focus on the
253 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 30, at 89I.
254 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The proponents of the cost-internalization
theory even point to the Exxon Valdez oil spill as an example of this situation. See Polinsky
& Shavell, supra note 3o , at 891 & n.56. This is not surprising because Professors Polinsky
and Shavell served as consultants for Exxon Corporation within its numerous appeals of the
punitive damage award. Id. at 870 n.aI.
Professor Calandrillo also advocates a deterrence-based cost-internalization method
of calculating punitive damages, but he believes that punitive damages were appropriate
because Exxon Shipping Co. "ended up escaping liability for many of the harms it caused
due to the quirks of the governing maritime law." See Calandrillo, supra note 98, at 817. The
phrase "escapes liability," however, assumes that liability is possible; if the governing law does
not recognize any possibility of liability, there is no liability to escape. Professor Calandrillo's
criticism is more aptly directed at maritime law on compensatory damages. See Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 30, at 939 ("[Rlemedies for missing components of harm would be best
pursued through revision of the rules used to calculate compensatory damages.").
255 The Court also could have awarded something less than the I: I ratio. Even within its
analysis, the Court found the median ratio to be under i:1, but then chose a i:I ratio for this
case. Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 515.
256 Professor Hylton's analysis of the proper punitive damage award in Exxon Shipping
Co. has multiple parts. If the activity at issue is economically desirable, the cost-internalization
approach should apply. See Hylton, supra note 45, at 452-53. But if the activity is considered
"incompetent[ly] ... pilot[ing] a supertanker":
To find the appropriate penalty under the less favorable view of events offered
here, one must determine Exxon's gain from employing an incompetent captain.
This gain is probably small, as it is the difference between the cost of employing
Joseph Hazelwood and that of employing a competent ship captain. Given that
the likelihood of detection, identification, and suit was oo%, there would be no
need to inflate this gain estimate to correct for the chance the defendant would
avoid punishment. This estimation procedure suggests that the minimum gain-
eliminating penalty is far less than the $5 billion punitive award. On the other
hand, if we are sure that the Exxon's activity is one that merits a gain-eliminating
penalty, then there is no reason to believe, on deterrence grounds, that the $5
billion punitive award against Exxon is excessive.
Id. at 453-54.
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defendant's expected gain from its conduct."7 Thus, just like with optimal
deterrence, the Court's described deterrence purpose does not include
complete deterrence.
2. Some Generic Notion of Deterrence Survives.-Despite the Court's rejection
of optimal and complete deterrence as inconsistent with punitive damages'
common law deterrence purpose, Exxon Shipping Co. shows that the Court
believes that deterrence has a place within punitive damages. This is clear
from the Court's focus on the decision whether to commit the tortious
conduct. Specifically, the Court wants Justice Holmes's bad man to know
the likely amount of punitive damages when he is evaluating the "the
stakes .. . in choosing one course of action or another."21 8 This reflects a
deterrence focus-presumably, the hope is that those stakes will dissuade
the potential tortfeasor from committing tortious conduct in the first
place 59
If this presumption is what the Court had in mind, however, the Court
acted in opposition to how some scholars interpret Justice Holmes's
purpose for introducing the bad man's perspective. The interpretation is
that legislatures should consider the bad man's perspective to ensure that
remedies will actually force the bad man to change his behavior.2 60 Punitive
damages will (supposedly) force that behavior change because of the bad
man's inability to calculate the damages.2 61 In Exxon Shipping Co., however,
the Court enables the bad man to calculate the damages-facilitating the
bad man's activities and "allow[ing] him to become evil, rather than forcing
him to behave as though he were good.
2 6
Regardless of whether predictability facilitates the bad man, the Court
presents some deterrence purpose by focusing on the decision-making
process. And the Court's idea of deterrence is broader than specific
257 See Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 473 (focusing on the idea that a penalty should be
reasonably predictable with no reference to expected gain).
258 Id. at 502.
259 Deterrence is thus preemptive. In contrast, punishment occurs post-conduct; it is
proper if what the defendant did is morally reprehensible and deserving of punitive damages.
It is reactionary. The Court's focus is preemptive deterrence, not reactionary punishment.
26o See, e.g., Jimenez, supra note 135, at 2126 (arguing that Justice Holmes's purpose was
for lawmakers to consider the bad man's perspective so they could change the law to affect his
decision-making for the benefit of the public). Changing the laws, if done effectively, should
deter the potential tortfeasor. Id. at 2115-16 ("Holmes's insistence on the separation of law
and morality exists to help us understand the bad man view of law, which in turn helps us
understand why the bad man behaves as he does, which in turn helps us deter the bad man,
which in turn helps us protect the good man.") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
261 See Grey, supra note 134, at 36, 54 (explaining that to reach Justice Holmes's bad
man, a legislature should look "to criminal penalties, punitive damages, or injunction, not just
compensatory damages").
262 Jimenez, supra note 135, at 2126. Professor Jimenez argues that the Supreme Court
misunderstood Justice Holmes's purpose as empowering the bad man. Id.
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deterrence of the potential tortfeasor. The Court also wants the "bad man's
counterparts" to similarly be able to look ahead and see that they will face
a "penalty scheme [that] ... threaten[s] them with a fair probability of
suffering in like degree when they wreak like damage."2 63 As soon as the
Court mentions the bad man's counterparts, the concept of deterrence
expands from specific to general, even though many thought that the
Court rejected general deterrence as an unconstitutional aim of punitive
damages."I
That is as far as the Court goes, however, in describing the common
law deterrence purpose of punitive damages. There is no indication if
what is desired is a total deterrence attempting to prohibit the conduct
under all circumstances or if the conduct is sometimes desirable. There is
no indication of how the punitive damages can achieve this "deterrence"
when there is no possibility of increasing the damages based on the
chances of escaping liability (because the Court believes those chances to
be irrelevant). The Court's lack of explanation is even more striking given
the decision's common law basis; it leaves the damages with an aimless
deterrence purpose.
IV. THE UNAVOIDABLE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The state can constitutionally impose punitive damages to further its
legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence.2 65 The state's interests
in imposing these damages have always matched the damages' traditional
common law punishment and deterrence purposes.2 66 Change those
purposes, however, and the constitutionality of punitive damages falls apart.
In Exxon Shipping Co., the Court does just that. It describes a punishment
263 Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 502.
264 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (describing the Court's rejection
of general deterrence in Philip Morris); Colby, supra note 24, at 463-64 (describing the
remaining deterrence "interest in ensuring that the defendant does not victimize her again");
Scheuerman, supra note 3o, at 933.
One possible explanation is that Philip Morris is a constitutional limitation, which would
trump the common law vision of deterrence in Exxon Shipping Co. The better reading of
Philip Morris, however, is that it constitutionally limits the punishment purpose of punitive
damages. The Court is clearly concerned about damage awards including amounts for harms
the defendant had already caused to nonparties-a reactionary punishment focus. Similarly,
the Court's due process analysis focuses on past harms. First, the Court was concerned about
the defendant's opportunity to defend itself against allegations that it harmed nonparties.
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,353-54 (2007). Second, the Court was concerned
about a "standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation. How many such victims
are there? How seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur?" Id.
at 354. Philip Aorris limits punitive damages' punishment purpose by limiting the scope of
what conduct is punishable through an award.
265 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
266 See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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with no basis and a generic "deterrence" unconcerned with the chances
of escaping liability. 67 These concepts are insufficient to constitutionally
justify the imposition of punitive damages.
The imposition of punitive damages as conceived in Exxon Shipping
Co. cannot further a state's traditional morality-based punishment
interest. The divorce from morality also threatens the damages' status as a
"punishment" given its failure to express moral condemnation. But even
if they were still a punishment, the wrongdoer, aka Justice Holmes's bad
man, does not appreciate that moral condemnation or any stigma. Under
the Court's description, the damages are hardly a punishment.
With respect to deterrence, the Court has already emasculated the
purpose in describing its inability to constitutionally justify an award.1
6
1
Within its common law authority in Exxon, the Court describes a concept
of "deterrence" that does not match how the concept is more commonly
understood. The Court also gave no explanation regarding how the
damages might achieve deterrence and hurt the damages' ability to achieve
any notion of deterrence by failing to acknowledge the effects of under-
detection and under-enforcement. Without some consideration of the
chances of escaping liability, punitive damages have less ability to achieve
whatever type of deterrence the state might seek.
Imagine that Exxon Shipping Company was able to challenge,
constitutionally, its reduced punitive damage award. The common law
purposes, as conceived by the Court in Exxon Shipping Co., preclude the
award's constitutionality. Why was punishment appropriate? It cannot be
because of the defendant's immoral conduct. Punishment regardless of
immorality does not further a state's interest in punishing immoral conduct.
But more importantly, without morality, do the damages even constitute a
punishment? Was Exxon Shipping Company even punished when it was
forced to pay the punitive damages, or was it just subjected to another
fine? These unanswered questions make it impossible to conclude that the
damages sufficiently further a legitimate state punishment interest, and
thus the damages are unconstitutional.
Similarly, the punitive damage award cannot be justified by the vague
notion of generically discouraging tortious conduct-not even an award
equal to the compensatory award. How many other potential tortfeasors
would otherwise choose to incompetently pilot supertankers carrying
millions of gallons of oil in the absence of the punitive damage award?
Probably none. And problematically, some companies may choose to not
transport oil at all because of the potential of punitive damages. It is far
from clear that imposing punitive damages would accomplish even some
vague idea of deterrence. The Court's description of punitive damages'
267 Seesupra Parts IV.A.2, IV.B.2.
268 See supra Part II.C.2.
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punishment and deterrence purposes demonstrates that the damages
cannot further legitimate state interests in punishment or deterrence,
making the damages unconstitutional.
The Court has always assumed that the state's interests and the damages'
common law purposes are identical, so perhaps the Court also meant to
redefine the state interests served by imposing punitive damages to mirror
the described common law purposes.169 If this is true, the imposition of
punitive damages as described by the Court in Exxon Shipping Co. would
further the state interests. However, those state interests would no longer
be legitimate-as they must be for the imposition of damages to be
constitutional. 270
A state interest in "punishment" as described by the Court is not
legitimate. The Court rejected morality-based punishment,17' leaving
-based punishment-but the Court did not fill in the blank. A state
interest in -based punishment cannot be legitimate; there is no basis
to explain why, when, or how much punishment is appropriate.
Similarly, the idea of "deterrence" that the Court describes is not a
legitimate state interest. Even before Exxon Shipping Co., the Court's
holdings left the deterrence purpose looking impotent, constitutionally
speaking. When given the chance to directly address the substance of this
purpose in Exxon Shipping Co., the Court described a generic and hollow
concept of deterrence."2 The Court rejected defined goals like optimal or
complete deterrence. 73 It is difficult for a state interest in deterrence to be
legitimate when the concept remains undefined.
Aside from issues related to the state interests, punitive damages with
common law purposes as conceived by the Court in Exxon Shipping Co.
are separately unconstitutional because of their arbitrary imposition. The
269 This assumption is rational given how the Court has always assumed that the
damages' purposes match the state interests in imposing the damages. See Part II.C.
270 SeePart II.C. A tortfeasor has a substantive due process constitutional right protecting
her from the imposition of a punitive damage award unsupported by sufficient state interests.
BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 ("Only when an award can fairly be categorized as 'grossly excessive'
in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). The Court does not usually explain the
constitutional challenge based on the tortfeasor's right, instead focusing on the state's inability
to impose an award. A consequence of the Court's focus on the state's inability is that we do
not know if the tortfeasor's constitutional right is fundamental. If it is a fundamental right,
state action infringing on it is constitutional only if justified by a compelling state interest and
the state action is narrowly tailored to achieve that state interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 155 0973). If it is not a fundamental right, state action infringing on it is constitutional if
justified by a legitimate state interest and the state action is reasonably related to achieving
that state interest. Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F3d 1392, 1403 (3d Cir. 1997). Under either
review though, if the state interest is illegitimate, the state action would be unconstitutional.
271 See supra Part IVA.i.
272 Seesupra Part IV.B.2.
273 See supra Part IV.B.i.
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Constitution prohibits "the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary
punishments on a tortfeasor."' 74 The Court removed the traditional morality
basis for imposition and failed to replace it. After Exxon Shipping Co., there
is no basis for imposition, much less a principled one. And without a basis,
the imposition of punitive damages is arbitrary and unconstitutional.
Unconstitutionality aside, punitive damages' common law purposes
justify the damages' existence. The highest Court in the nation, however,
thinks that punitive damages "punish" for an unclear reason and generically
"deter" even when not necessary. These descriptions leave little reason
to retain the damages from a policy perspective. Again, the traditional
morality-based punishment purpose and the possibility of deterrence are
the very reasons that courts created the damages. Without that purpose and
possibility, the reasons for the damages' existence are gone-which should
further motivate both legislative and court reform of punitive damages."'5
CONCLUSION
Justice Holmes's bad man sees the law as its consequences. Committing
a tort such as fraudulent misrepresentation, for example, simply means an
obligation to pay a compensatory sum. The immorality of lying does not
sway the bad man; he sees only the price tag. This man, ignorant of morality,
is who the Court chose to invoke in its special opportunity to describe how
punitive damages should work-even though punitive damages have been
inextricably linked to morality for centuries. The Court described a system
in which even Justice Holmes's bad man should be able to fully appreciate
the total price tag of his tortious conduct, composed of both compensatory
and punitive damages.
What does this mean for punitive damages jurisprudence? It alters it
dramatically. The Court, acting properly within its common law authority,
redefined punitive damages' common law punishment and deterrence
purposes. This is important because the changed purposes may hurt the
continued justifiability of punitive damages from a policy perspective.
But the more important effect of the changed purposes is constitutional.
Punitive damages' common law purposes justify them constitutionally;
274 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,416 (2003).
275 Most reform of punitive damages has come from legislatures. See sources cited supra
note 221. In Exxon ShippingCo. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2oo8), however, the Court blamed courts
for the problematic evolution of punitive damages and urged courts to fix that problem: "[lin
the absence of legislation,... it is hard to see how the judiciary can wash its hands of a problem
it created . Id. at 507. Judicial reform of common law doctrine would not be unprecedented.
For instance, numerous state supreme courts rejected the traditional contributory negligence
bar and adopted a form of comparative fault. See Mclntyre v. Balentine, 833 SWA.2d 52, 55-56
(Tenn. 1992) (describing that eleven states judicially adopted a form of comparative fault
and that legislative inaction has never prevented judicial abolition of obsolete common law
doctrines, especially those created by the judiciary).
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altering the purposes can undercut their constitutionality. Surprisingly, the
Supreme Court case that does the most damage to the constitutionality of
punitive damages was not a constitutional challenge-the challenge was
based on boat law.
After Exxon Shipping Co., the punitive damages' punishment purpose
is unconnected to morality. The damages are not imposed based on the
immorality of conduct, the damages do not express moral condemnation,
and that moral condemnation is incapable of creating any punishing stigma.
Without the morality basis, it is not even clear that the damages constitute
a "punishment." The Court removes the basis of the punishment purpose
but does not replace it, so we are no longer sure why or how punitive
damages "punish."
The common law basis of Exxon Shipping Co. gave the Court an
opportunity to give the deterrence purpose independent substance, possibly
by adopting optimal or complete deterrence. Instead, the Court rejected
both theories by assuming away the relevance of under-detection and
under-enforcement; Justice Holmes's bad man willpay both compensatory
damages and punitive damages. Plus, the Court imposed punitive damages
despite guaranteed liability and the overdeterrence that will likely result.
The Court insists that the deterrence purpose is alive and well, but it is a
meaningless and possibly unnecessary "deterrence."
These described purposes of punitive damages make the damages
a bit pointless. More importantly, though, they make the damages
unconstitutional. Punitive damages no longer further legitimate state
interests in punishment and deterrence. Their imposition is arbitrary
given that there is no standard. If state interests now mirror the common
law purposes the Court described in Exxon Shipping Co., those rewritten
state interests are not legitimate and cannot justify, constitutionally, the
imposition of punitive damages.
Exxon Shipping Co. seems like a harmless case. It has been largely
ignored by academics because of its common law basis. Its common law
basis, however, was how the Court was able to so dramatically affect the
constitutionality of punitive damages. Punitive damages' common law
punishment and deterrence purposes ensure that the damages further
legitimate state interests, making punitive damages constitutional.
By depleting the common law purposes, the Court undercut that
constitutionality. Exxon Shipping Co. is far from harmless; it should be the
last nail in the coffin for punitive damages.
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